

POLICING DOMESTIC DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH:
A STUDY OF TURK'S NORM RESISTANCE THEORY

By

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This study applying Austin Turk's norm resistance theory examines police-citizen encounters at domestic disputes in Charleston, SC and Savannah, GA. Turk's theory is abstract enough to be able to account for various forms of conflict (e.g., resisting arrest, verbal assaults, obstructing an officer, deadly force). He argues that normative conflict is inherent in all authority-subject relations and is more likely to become overt when both subjects and authorities act congruently with their beliefs, when neither subjects or authorities are sophisticated in their abilities to manipulate the situation, and when the subjects are organized. Data for this research was obtained from official police reports, police personnel records and criminal histories of the batterers.

In Charleston, officers are more inclined to encounter conflict when batterers are visibly intoxicated and the

disputes are still in-progress. This is associated with the concept of sophistication or the knowledge and the ability to manipulate the opposition. Police-citizen conflict is also more likely when police arrest more than one disputant. This is associated with the concept of organization or the social support obtained from others present. Officers who are younger, nonwhite or female may be more likely to confront norm resistance at domestic calls when dealing with older, white, male batterers. The emerging pattern can be understood by the phenomenon of social deference or deference reversals. Failing to defer automatically to the officer's authority, some subjects instead evaluate the officer's social status (age, race and gender) in deciding whether to submit.

The final hypothesis that was generated for this dissertation focused on the congruence between cultural and social norms. When consistent, overt conflict is more likely to follow. A domestic violence proarrest policy was examined in Savannah, GA. The results indicate that patrol officers continued to use discretion after administrators instituted the proarrest policy. The unintended consequences (i.e., authority-subject conflict) of the policy could not be evaluated.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Overt conflict between authorities and subjects may take a variety of forms. These include: (1) the use of deadly force by authorities (Blumberg, 1983; Croft, 1985; Donahue, 1983; Fyfe, 1978, 1981; Geller & Karales, 1981; Jacobs & Britt, 1978; Kania & Mackey, 1977, 1992; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979), (2) the use of nonlethal force by authorities (Croft, 1985; Friedrich, 1980), (3) assaults on authorities by subjects (Choi, 1989; Geller & Karales, 1982; Margarita, 1980; Uchida & Brooks, 1988), and (4) resistance, interference or obstruction by subjects (Croft, 1985; Reiss, 1980). While the homicides of subjects or authorities can be tragic, there are many forms of overt conflict that have not received much notice by criminologists. Croft (1985) explains:

[D]espite the importance attached to the issue of police use of force, very little systematic and reliable information is available on the subject. Aside from a few studies on police use of force, the research emphasis has been on "deadly force"-- police use of their firearms.¹ (p. 41)

¹ Croft (1985) advised that one of the major problems researchers face who want to study police use of force is the difficulty in obtaining information. "Only a handful of

The objective of this dissertation is to shed light on authority-subject conflict. The research is done within the context of domestic disturbances, which have been traditionally viewed as one of the most explosive calls for the police (Bard, 1974; Blount et al., 1992; Buzawa & Buzawa, 1990, 1992; Davis, 1983; Ellis, 1987; Muir, 1977). The types of overt conflict examined range from verbal threats to lethal force.

In order to understand conflict between authorities and subjects, it is insufficient to focus exclusively on deadly force, which is rather infrequent and may be highly politicized. What is called for is a framework that can assist us in understanding all forms of conflict. One of the theories that is abstract enough to be able to handle conflict on several levels is Austin Turk's (1966, 1969) theory of norm resistance.

Turk has been called "the most complex and unique theorist within the conflict tradition" (Orcutt, 1983, p. 322). He has discussed the power of the authorities (e.g., police) and the use of coercion when subjects refuse to grant deference.

There are those in society who constitute the dominant, decision-making category--the authorities--and those who make up the subordinate

police departments in the United States maintain records on use of force incidents and even where such records are maintained, they may not be available for scholarly research" (p. 48).

category, who are affected by but scarcely affect law--the subjects. (Turk, 1969, p. 33)

Unlike radical or critical criminologists (Platt, 1974; Quinney, 1980), Turk (1969) does not see society as neatly distributed between a ruling elite and a powerless mass; instead he advocates a pluralistic conflict theory. In addition, Turk dismisses ideology and focuses on a scientific and objective conflict theory.

Enthusiasts of the idea that conflict theory is and should be a partisan critique generally go on to advance the self-defeating thesis that any theory is nothing more than an ideology. (Turk, 1979, p. 459)

Akers has acknowledged that Turk's theory is loyal to the conflict tradition and "capable of and intended for testing free of its ideological freight" (1979, p. 539). Like Dahrendorf (1959), Turk (1969) focuses on differences of power rather than the means of production or economics (see discussion of Turk in Akers, 1979; Lilly et al., 1989; Liska, 1981; Orcutt, 1983; Vold & Bernard, 1986). He focuses on the use of legal power to coerce subjects but not the origins of that power.

Turk's (1966, 1969) use of the term "norm resistance," refers to overt conflict between authorities and subjects. Turk's theoretical abstraction permits his arguments to be extended in ways that allow drawing new and meaningful hypotheses about police-citizen conflict.

Turk's (1966, 1969) conflict theory addresses extra-legal factors, (e.g., employment, sex, age, class,

education, immigration) and the differences between authorities and subjects. The potential for conflict exists when authorities and subjects are dissimilar in race, age, gender, education, and nationality. Conflict is more likely to become overt when the authorities and/or subjects' cultural norms, i.e., laws or beliefs, are congruent with their social norms, i.e., actual behavior. A result of the congruence of cultural and social norms is less compromise and an increase in the potential for violence. For example, males who believe they are the "kings of their castle" (cultural norm) and use physical force to control their spouses and/or family members (social norm) are likely to have more difficulty deferring to authorities who must arrest (under mandatory arrest policies).² A thorough discussion of Turk's theory is provided in a separate chapter. At present, it is enough to highlight some basic themes.

Police use of extra-legal factors for arrest decisions has been well documented (Black, 1980; Ferraro, 1989; Lundman, 1974; Piliavin & Briar, 1964; Powell, 1990; Smith & Klein, 1984). To date, qualitative methods and interactionist theories have been used to examine specific exchanges (Davis, 1983; Manning, 1980; Margarita, 1980;

² Gelles and Strauss believe that "the most telling of all attributes of the battering man is that he feels inadequate and sees violence as a culturally acceptable way to be both dominant and powerful" (1988, p. 89).

Toch, 1969; Reiss, 1974). Turk takes a unique approach by suggesting that rates of overt conflict should vary across "structured situations." He directs us to examine the variables that structure the situations, rather than look at social psychological meanings of the participants or symbolic details of particular interactions.

A sociological theory of interaction is required; moreover, it must be a theory of interaction among groups and categories of people rather than a social psychological explanation of patterns in interactions among individuals, even though psychological assumptions will necessarily be implicit in any such theory. (Turk, 1969, p. 53)

The police response to domestic disturbances has been at issue, particularly since Sherman and Berk's (1984) Minneapolis Experiment found that arrest reduced the recidivism of batterers.³ Subsequently, police chiefs, legislators and criminologists began to focus more on the domestic dispute. Sherman and Berk's research has been linked with many of the changes in police practices and policies across the nation. These new policies advocate arrest and are based on the concept of deterrence.⁴

³ The terms domestic disturbance, domestic dispute, domestic violence or family fight may be used interchangeably. These may involve husband-wife, boyfriend-girlfriend, same sex partners or any combination of family members or relatives. In general, this study relies on police reports that label the call a "domestic."

⁴ Some studies refer to a mandatory arrest policy, while others use the term presumptive arrest. The former generally compels police to arrest the batterer, while the latter suggests it. In either case, the officer may arrest without witnessing the assault take place. Prior to these new policies, officers could only advise the victim to file

According to Ferraro (1989, p. 61), "[T]he changes in the statutes are a response to the fact that most assaults against wives occur in private settings and fall in the misdemeanor category." Recently, researchers have questioned the conclusions of the Minneapolis Experiment and have stated that formal arrest has no effect on recidivism (Dunford, 1992; Dunford et al., 1990; Hirschel et al., 1992; Pate & Hamilton, 1992; Sherman et al., 1992). However, police officials at all levels remain convinced that proarrest policies are effective (Blount et al., 1992; Bouza, 1991). A South Carolina chief attributed a reduction in the homicides in his city to a mandatory arrest policy.⁵ A recent study in a Midwestern city found that 88% of the officers surveyed supported mandatory arrest (Friday et al., 1991).

While there is disagreement over proarrest and recidivism, its unintended consequences have been largely ignored. After their study of violence toward officers in Baltimore County, MD, Uchida and Brooks concluded:

A research question that should be examined in the future is the extent to which different

a complaint, act as a mediator or separate the disputants for the night unless the offense was a felony or occurred in the presence of the officer. Both presumptive and mandatory arrest are considered proarrest or preferred arrest policies and depart from the in-presence requirement for misdemeanor crimes.

⁵ Personal communication with Chief Reuben Greenberg of the Charleston, SC Police Department on September 3, 1991.

police methods affect the number of officer deaths and injuries taking place during domestic disturbances. This question is especially important today, given the increasing demand for police departments to adopt an arrest approach for dealing with domestic disturbances. (1988, p. 102)

Summary

In this dissertation, police-citizen conflict is examined at domestic disturbances in Charleston, SC and in Savannah, GA. Turk's (1969) theory of norm resistance is used to help us understand why some disputes result in overt conflict between officers and citizens, while others do not. A domestic violence proarrest policy is then examined in Savannah. Has presumptive arrest increased the probability of police-citizen conflict, as the officers' cultural norms and social norms become congruent?

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

Although the problem of conflict between officers and citizens is examined within the framework of domestic disputes, the findings are germane to several other police-citizen encounters (e.g., arrests, general disturbances, loud parties, fight calls). There has been a limited amount of scholarly research of police-citizen violence at domestic disturbances; however, more is known about police-citizen conflict in other contexts (e.g., arrests, police use of deadly force).

This section begins by reviewing research on police use of nonlethal force. Many of the early studies were conducted through direct observation; they primarily focused on police discretion and the decision to arrest (Black & Reiss, 1970; Lundman, 1974; Piliavin & Briar, 1964; Skolnick, 1966; Sykes & Clark, 1980; Westley, 1970). In the early 1980s, quantitative studies started to emerge, and a popular subject was the police use of lethal as well as nonlethal force (Blumberg, 1983; Donahue, 1983; Friedrich, 1980; Fyfe, 1978).¹ Citizen violence toward the police

¹ Deadly force is "the use of firearms or any other object likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

also received some notice by researchers during the 1980s (Chamlin, 1989; Choi, 1989; Geller & Karales, 1982; Margarita, 1980; Uchida & Brooks, 1988). Unfortunately, resisting arrest and other minor forms of conflict (e.g., refusing to obey, interfering with the police) have rarely been researched by criminologists.² Academic literature on the police response to domestic disputes is also addressed in the literature review. The emphasis is on the dangers of policing domestics (Choi, 1989; Garner & Clemmer, 1987; Uchida & Brooks, 1988) and preferred arrest policies (Friday et al., 1991; Hirschel et al., 1992; Sherman & Berk, 1984).

Police Use of Nonlethal Force

No problem . . . we R hungry . . . we got a little physical w/ a [name omitted] on Columbus . . . it was fun . . . we had to teach him a little respect . . . for the police . . . hahahahaha . . . we had fun . . . no stick time though. (Los Angeles Police Department Mobile Digital Terminal

Nondeadly force is the use of police batons, (e.g., PR-24s) or other impact weapons, chemical agents (e.g., mace), canine bites, or other objects used as weapons. In addition, striking blows by officers with their hands or feet is also an example of nondeadly force" (Lakeland, FL Police Department, 1991, p. 2).

² The differences among charges are illustrated in the police policy for one city. Any subject who refuses to comply with an officer's orders may be charged with "refusing to obey." If the subject makes physically evasive movements to defeat an officer's attempt at arrest (e.g., pushing or pulling away or not allowing the officer to apply handcuffs), the charge may be "resisting arrest." Attempting to or inflicting bodily harm upon the officer will usually result in a misdemeanor or felony charge of assault or battery (section adapted from Procedural Orders, Lakeland, FL Police Department, February 3, 1991).

transmission, cited in Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991, p. 49)

In a very real sense, the patrolman-to-citizen exchanges are moral contests in which the authority of the state is either confirmed, denied or left in doubt. (Van Maanen, 1980, p. 298)

Many of the first important studies of police-citizen interactions focused on subject demeanor and arrest (Black, 1980; Piliavin & Briar, 1964; Sykes & Clark, 1980). Black (1980) analyzed officer-complainant interactions and found disrespectful complainants were not taken seriously. However, officers did not always react to disrespectful citizens with force. Unless there was a doubt as to who was in charge, in the majority of encounters officers did not perceive citizens as a threat to their authority (Piliavin & Briar, 1964; Reiss, 1980). Black compares the differences in how magistrates and police officers handle disrespectful citizens:

Unlike the judge, . . . the policeman has no special legal weapons in his arsenal for dealing with citizens who refuse to defer to his authority at a verbal or otherwise symbolic level. (1980, p. 159)

Unofficial means may be used to manage defiant subjects. Officers may use "street justice" (as Los Angeles Police officers appear to have done to Rodney King in 1991). Some officers perceive the government's authority as their own personal power (Van Maanen, 1980). The officers' need for status and respect has been associated with a greater likelihood of violence (Sykes & Clark, 1980; Westley, 1970).

However, Westley (1970) believes that officers generally know the consequences of abusing their powers and are cautious about when they do it.

Many of the initial studies of police-citizen encounters were conducted through direct observation (Black, 1980; Lundman, 1974; Piliavin & Briar, 1964; Reiss, 1974; Skolnick, 1966; Van Maanen, 1980). Some of the researchers also attempted to quantify their observations (Lundman et al., 1980; Sykes & Clark, 1980). A seminal study conducted by Albert Reiss (1980) in 1966 in Boston, Washington, DC, and Chicago found the presence of additional officers actually encouraged police violence and their use of force. According to Westley (1970), officers rarely apply any sanctions against a colleague who uses violence against a citizen. The same phenomenon was also discussed by Toch, who said, "Few officers may be violent, but these are backed by peers who see police bonds as links to survival" (1977, p. 31). The relationship between the number of officers present and violence is complex and difficult to measure since we do not know if the conflict erupted before or after additional officers arrived at the call.

Other researchers have suggested that the number of officers and witnesses present was correlated with the police use of force (Brooks, 1989; Croft, 1985; Reiss, 1980; Smith & Visser, 1981); however, the order of this relationship may present methodological problems. Friedrich

(1980, p. 91) asks, "does the audience promote the use of force or does the use of force attract [the] audience?"

Black (1980) could not find any evidence officers discriminated on the basis of race when demeanor was controlled. However, Skolnick (1966) found that racial bias by the police was routine in an early observational study of two police departments. He stated, "The average policeman does not like Negroes; and since most policemen are straightforward and outspoken, few would deny such a generalization, at least among themselves" (Skolnick, 1966, p. 81). Officers may be more hostile toward young black males than black females. Skolnick (1966, p. 86) stated,

He may sometimes sympathize with the Negro mother's lack of funds, especially if she is on welfare, but he maintains a fundamental hostility toward the young black male.

In a multivariate analysis of the observational data of Reiss, Friedrich (1980) found that demeanor (e.g., intoxication) and the number of other police and citizens present had a significant impact on the use of force by police. Looking at 18 variables, Friedrich found that individual traits of officers and suspects (e.g., sex, age, race, experience and class) had almost no explanatory value. However, Friedrich was pessimistic about these findings because the full regression model only explained 12% of the variance of the use of force.

The major conclusion which must be drawn from a study that finds 18 factors thought to explain the use of force accounting for slightly more than 10

percent of the variation in the use of force is that either our theoretical understanding of the phenomenon is very weak or our methodology for studying that phenomenon is very weak, or both. (Friedrich, 1980, p. 96)

Police use of force frequently involves minor misdemeanors, such as intoxicated and disorderly individuals, rather than serious felonies. Subjects are often distraught or deranged at the time of the encounter with officers (Croft, 1985). Subjects' use of alcohol was associated with police use of force (Croft, 1985; Friedrich, 1980). A problem discovered by Croft (1985), however, was that police reports of the Rochester, NY Police Department did not always mention alcohol use by subjects, although Croft believed that the irrational behavior by subjects and/or the location of the call, i.e., outside a bar or at a party, were sufficient indicators that the subjects were drinking.

Research conducted in New York City, Denver and Miami all found that police use of force was infrequent (Bayley, 1986; Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Fyfe, 1989a). Bayley and Garofalo (1989) observed 350 tours of duty in three police precincts in New York City and concluded that citizen-to-citizen violence was usually over by the time officers arrived. When violence was in progress, officers used physical force 8% of the time; however, if the dispute was over, force was used only 6% of the time ($p < .01$).

The use of force by citizens toward officers was also uncommon. When violence was still in progress, citizens assaulted officers 9% of the time; however, when violence was not in progress, this decreased to only 1%; $X^2 = 17.84$, $p < .01$ (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989). Control variables, (e.g., area of the city, suspect intoxication, suspect race, or officer experience) were not used by Bayley and Garofalo. Denver police used force just 5.4% of the time (Bayley, 1986), and Miami officers used force in 12% of their calls (Fyfe, 1989a). These three studies were observational, i.e., the researchers rode along with the patrol officers on their shifts, and it is unknown if this affected the officers' or the citizens' behavior.

Most individual characteristics of officers (e.g., race, sex and education) have been inadequate predictors of the use of force (Croft, 1985; Grennan, 1987; Sherman, 1980). Officer age and amount of experience may be more promising. However, caution should be used when analyzing these two indicators, since they may be highly correlated with each other, according to Sherman (1980).

Croft (1985) found that younger, less experienced officers and those appointed at an earlier age were more likely to use force in Rochester, NY. Multivariate analysis was not used in Croft's study, so these findings may be spurious. For example, younger officers are usually assigned to the graveyard shift and are working in more

violent areas of the city, which may increase their use of force (Fyfe, 1978).

In sum, studies indicate that the police use of force is uncommon; however, when it does occur, subjects' demeanor appears to be one of the better predictor variables. Individual characteristics of officers (e.g., sex, race and education) were not related to the use of force, with the exception of officer age and experience. Control variables (e.g., assignment, area and shift) should be used, since younger officers with less experience are often assigned to the most violent neighborhoods on the most active shifts.

Police Use of Lethal Force

The youngster who flees because police spells danger may be gunned down by an officer who feels threatened by the youngster's running. Such occasions are doubly tragic because the two parties are victims of reciprocal error. (Toch, 1977, p. 32)

Police use of lethal force has resulted in a great deal of research during the 1980s. At least five doctoral dissertations (Blumberg, 1983; Donahue, 1983; Rodez, 1980; Taylor-Greene, 1988; Uchida, 1982), along with numerous smaller studies have focused on this phenomenon.

Researchers have looked at individual, organizational, and structural variables and their relationship to the use of deadly force. Several studies have examined the relationship between race and deadly force (Blumberg, 1981, 1983; Fyfe, 1981; Geller & Karales, 1981; Meyer, 1980;

Robin, 1963; Taylor-Greene, 1988); administrative policies and deadly force (Fyfe, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1989a; Matulia, 1982; Rodez, 1980; Scharf & Binder, 1983; Taylor-Greene, 1988; Uchida, 1982); and economic inequality and deadly force (Jacobs & Britt, 1978; Kania & Mackey, 1977).

James Fyfe (1989b), a prodigious writer on the police use of deadly force, has distinguished between "extralegal" and "unnecessary" violence. While extralegal violence consists of abusive and unethical actions by officers, unnecessary violence involves basic officer incompetence. Fyfe explained that the motivation is different in these two situations.

Extralegal violence involves the willful and wrongful use of force by officers who knowingly exceed the bounds of their office. Unnecessary violence occurs when well-meaning officers prove incapable of dealing with the situations they encounter without needless or too hasty resort to force. (Fyfe, 1989b, p. 465)

Frequently, officers fail to properly diagnose encounters until it is too late. Fyfe believes that police officers must take more time and preparation in order to prevent violence. For example, officers who rush into crowded supermarkets in response to robbery calls may be provoking a violent confrontation. Officers should expand their knowledge of their patrol areas and try to avoid making "split second decisions" (Fyfe, 1989b).³

³ Fyfe (1989b) discusses the use of concealment and knowledge. If officers know their beat, they can find places to conceal themselves and not force a gun battle.

Many researchers have examined the relationship between race and deadly force (Blumberg, 1981; Fyfe, 1981, 1982; Geller & Karales, 1981). In Chicago and New York City, black officers were more likely to use lethal force than white or Hispanic officers (Fyfe, 1981; Geller & Karales, 1981). Like officer age and experience, the disproportionate assignment of minority officers to higher crime areas may explain this phenomenon. Many police shootings occur when minority officers are off-duty within their own neighborhoods (Fyfe, 1981).

There is evidence that black subjects are shot and killed by police at a significantly higher rate than other races.⁴ This may be associated with higher rates of arrest, especially for crimes of violence (Geller & Karales, 1981; Matulia, 1982). Meyer (1980) found Los Angeles police officers were more likely to shoot unarmed blacks than unarmed whites or Hispanics. A decade ago, Fyfe (1982) discovered blacks in Memphis were at a greater risk of being shot by police, especially when they were fleeing from property crimes. Takagi (1974) charged the American police with having a separate trigger finger for blacks and whites. However, proving police racism in shooting situations is highly complex, especially given that baseline data is

⁴ For example, Alpert (1989) found 59% of the police shooting victims were black in Miami, FL, and the population of blacks at the time was just 25%. Kobler (1975) and Geller and Karales (1981) found similar patterns in Seattle and Chicago.

unavailable on the frequency of encounters or contacts between police and citizens of all races (Blumberg, 1981). All of the encounters where police elected not to use their firearms but could have are unknown. Geller (1985) refers to this as the "next frontier" of research on the use of deadly force.

Officer gender, education and socioeconomic status (SES) have all been found to be unrelated to the use of deadly force (Blumberg, 1983; Sherman & Blumberg, 1981). However, Blumberg (1983) found officer age and police experience were significant, even after controlling for risk exposures in separate studies he conducted in Atlanta and in Kansas City, MO.⁵ Younger, less experienced officers were more likely to be involved in police shootings. This relationship was also discovered by Croft (1985) in Rochester, NY. Perhaps younger officers are more aggressive and lack the emotional maturity necessary for policing (Blumberg, 1983). However, the layoff of 3,000 "junior" officers in New York City did not reduce shootings. Rather it increased the age and the amount of experience of the officers who were involved, as older officers were forced to replace younger ones on the streets (Fyfe, 1978).

Sherman and Langworthy (1979) found greater support for structural variables than organizational variables. They

⁵ High risk or low risk was established by controlling for arrest exposures and beat assignment (Blumberg, 1983, p. 43).

concluded that deadly force was correlated with: (1) general homicide rate, (2) violent index crime, (3) number of officers per 1,000 population, (4) gun density, (5) arrest rate, (6) violent arrest rates, and (7) the percent of personnel assigned to Internal Affairs. The strongest relationships were with the general homicide rate ($r = .55$), officers per 1,000 population ($r = .45$) and the violent crime index ($r = .37$). The number of supervisors per line officer, percentage of complaints of police misconduct investigated, percentage of complaints substantiated, unemployment rate, suicide rate and population density were all statistically insignificant. Since multivariate analyses were not used, some of the findings could prove spurious. However, these results are consistent with other studies of police-caused homicides that have used structural level variables (see Jacobs & Britt, 1978; Kania & Mackey, 1977, 1992).

Kania and Mackey (1977, 1992) and Jacobs and Britt (1978) examined the police use of deadly force across the United States. Using vital statistics from every state, Kania and Mackey (1977) found that structural and community level variables (e.g., welfare rate, police exposure to violent crime, homicide rate, food stamp rate and percentage of homes without televisions) were correlated with a higher rate of police-caused homicides. However, their study had a number of problems. "Race" was not examined and the

variable "welfare" was used as a proxy for social stratification. Some highly stratified states may actually have low welfare rates though. At the time, Kania and Mackey's research was referred to as "the only quantitative effort to examine police violence" (Jacobs & Britt, 1978, p. 405).

Kania and Mackey (1992) recently examined the impact of the Tennessee v. Garner (1985) decision, which found the Tennessee statute unconstitutional that permitted police officers to shoot a nonviolent fleeing felon. They discovered this case had the greatest impact on the states that have already been operating with more restrictive policies prior to the ruling than on those states that were less restrictive (i.e., applying the common law fleeing felon rule). Kania and Mackey concluded that the law and administrative policies have less effect on police-caused homicides than do community and structural variables.⁶

These data suggest that Fyfe's 1988 assumptions are in error and that the background levels of public violence are stronger predictors of state practices involving the police use of deadly force than state law or policies redrawn to conform to such laws. (Kania & Mackey, 1992, p. 12)

⁶ But for contrary findings, see Sparger and Giacomassi (1992) who recently examined the effect of Tennessee v. Garner (1985). They concluded that it was responsible for a reduction in police shootings and less discriminatory use of deadly force in Memphis. "The data suggest that between five and 15 lives were spared by adoption of a restrictive shooting policy" (Sparger & Giacomassi, 1992, p. 224).

Jacobs and Britt (1978) used multivariate analyses and determined that states with higher economic inequality, a higher violence index and a significant change in the percentage of population had the most police-caused homicides. They concluded that economic conflict theory could explain deadly force in the United States. However, Sherman (1980) cautioned that research using economic level variables can be difficult to assess, as the indicators are not selected in a systematic way. Additionally, economic conflict theory was never developed for the specific problem of police violence (Sherman, 1980).

Taylor-Greene (1988) found that officer shootings were best predicted by the civilian homicide rate. Administrative controls or civilian review were insignificant. Suspect race was correlated with lethal force only at the zero order but was insignificant in a multivariate model. These findings are consistent with the earlier study by Sherman and Langworthy (1979).

In summary, there seems to be a relationship between officer and subject race and deadly force (Fyfe, 1981; Geller & Karales, 1981; Matulia, 1982); however, it may be a spurious one. Black subjects are more likely to be arrested than whites and thus have higher exposure to potentially lethal situations (Geller & Karales, 1981; Matulia, 1982). Black officers are also more likely to work in violent neighborhoods on more dangerous shifts. There is some

evidence that younger and less experienced officers are more likely to be involved in the use of deadly force (Blumberg, 1983). However, this could again be related to assignment and/or shift. Structural variables (e.g., homicide rate, poverty rate) seem to provide more promise than either individual or administrative variables (Jacobs & Britt, 1978; Kania & Mackey, 1992, 1977; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979; Taylor-Greene, 1988).

Assaults on Police

No administrative policy, no strategy, no training program, no police procedure--not even bulletproof vests--has ever been shown to reduce violence against police. (Sherman, 1980, p. 9)

There has been less academic interest in violence toward the police than in the police use of deadly force. Uchida and Brooks (1988, p. 1) stated, "Unlike police use of deadly force, assaults and homicides of police have not received the attention by researchers that it merits." In 1988, almost 59,000 police officers were assaulted in the United States; approximately 83% of those assaults were with hands, fists or feet (Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1992). From 1980 to 1989, 801 officers were killed in the United States.⁷ Seventy percent of the assailants of police officers had a criminal record and 30% had a prior

⁷ This does not include the 713 officers who died accidentally in the performance of their duties (mostly by auto accidents).

arrest for a violent crime. Officers were more likely to be killed in the evening (between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.) and January was the most dangerous month of the year, while August was the safest month (Major, 1991).

Most of the research on violence toward officers has been descriptive and non-theoretical (Bristow, 1963; Fyfe, 1989b; Geller & Karales, 1982; Henley, 1987; Konstantin 1984; Major, 1991; McMurray, 1990). However, a few studies have looked at the phenomenon from a symbolic interactionist perspective (Bannon, 1976; Choi, 1990; Margarita, 1980) and economic conflict theory (Chamlin, 1989; Peterson & Bailey, 1988).

Margarita (1980) examined a century of police homicides (n = 245) of New York City police officers and found that in the majority of cases, suspects who murdered officers were "goal directed" and were trying to protect themselves from arrest. She discussed a five category typology: (1) perseverance, (2) autonomy, (3) protection, (4) defense of others, and (5) contempt. These categories were formerly used by Toch (1969) in his study of male violence. Margarita's findings may have important implications for mandatory arrest policies at domestics, since officers could be at a greater risk when they are compelled to arrest.⁸

⁸ The Supreme Court of Oregon found that police officers face civil liability if they fail to arrest at domestics when probable cause exists that an assault has been committed. In the case of Nearing v. Weaver, 1986, the

Austin, TX, police officers were also more likely to be assaulted when making an arrest, with 65% of the assaults on officers occurring in retaliation for applying handcuffs (Henley, 1987).

Peterson and Bailey (1988) used a multivariate model to examine the homicides of officers in all 50 states from 1977 to 1984. Police killings were regressed against several structural variables (e.g., percent black, percent family poverty, income inequality). They found police homicides were associated with societal factors (e.g., the divorce rate, the poverty rate); however, they cautioned additional explanatory variables (e.g. officer competence, errors in judgment) also may be necessary to understand the phenomenon (also see Chamlin, 1989). A serious problem with many cross-jurisdictional studies is the amount of variation that occurs within each state or unit of analysis.

Several studies have found that younger police officers, those with less than five years of experience, were more likely to be the victims of assaults and injuries (Bannon, 1976; Little, 1984; Uchida & Brooks, 1988). As with studies of police force, this may be explained by factors other than officer age or experience. Swanton (1985) discovered that older officers usually left the more "active" precincts and were working as police supervisors,

complainant alleged that officers knowingly failed to comply with Oregon's mandatory arrest policy (Gundle, 1986).

which would reduce their street exposure and their risk of being assaulted.

Forty percent of the suspects who assaulted officers in Baltimore County were males between 19 and 25 years old. When there were two subjects present, they tended to both be males from different age groups and the same race (Uchida & Brooks, 1988). Nationally, 70% of the suspects who killed officers had a previous arrest of some kind, and 21% were on parole or probation at the time of the event (Boylen & Little, 1990).

Alcohol was a significant factor in 47.5% of the assaults on officers in Austin, TX (Henley, 1987). Using FBI statistics, Konstantin (1984) found that officer initiated events or "on view" calls were more dangerous than calls received through radio dispatch (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Fyfe, 1989a). However, Konstantin included a myriad of police calls in the officer-initiated category (e.g., warrants, off-duty shootings and back-up calls not dispatched), which probably inflated the results.

In sum, the research generally reports that structural (e.g., poverty rate) and situational variables (suspect's alcohol use, self-protection) relate to assaults on police. Age or officer experience were the variables at an individual level of analysis that seem to relate to assaults on officers. Theoretical research on police assaults has been meager. Those efforts that have been informed by

theory have usually applied social psychological explanations (Choi, 1990; Margarita, 1980) or an economic conflict theory (Chamlin, 1989). Sherman (1980, p. 94) stated, "the problem is to develop a theory that not only explains variance, but also offers the symmetry, coherence, and elegance of formal theories. Whether such a theory is possible remains to be seen."

Resisting, Refusing and Interfering

What is crisis for the citizen and diversion for the outsider becomes routine for the patrolman.
(Reiss, 1974, p. 7)

The research on resisting arrest, refusing to obey and interfering with police has been very limited. FBI statistics (gathered from state and local police agencies) traditionally have focused on more serious forms of police-citizen violence (e.g., homicides, shootings). Since many police agencies do not maintain specific files on resisting arrests (as they do in the cases involving police use of force or citizen complaints), obtaining this information can be difficult. One method is by direct observation of officers, as Reiss (1974) did in his classic study. Another way is through the departmental incident reports themselves.

According to Reiss (1974), citizens behaved in ways during or following an arrest that made them open to the

charge of resisting arrest 12% of the time.⁹ Reiss also found that the majority of injuries to officers occurred with interfering charges rather than resisting. Interfering usually involves those who are not primary suspects, such as witnesses or even victims. The individual may attempt to stop the officer from making an arrest. Reiss found that both resisting arrest and interfering were far more common at misdemeanor calls than felonies (also see Croft, 1985; Henley, 1987). Minor infractions, such as fights or disorderly conduct, more commonly result in norm conflict between police and subjects and provoke subjects into believing that authority is being used unjustly (Reiss, 1974).¹⁰

While Westley (1970) has claimed that some officers use resisting or interfering charges to conceal brutality, Reiss (1974) disagreed. Reiss (1974, p. 55) said, "An officer generally does not cover himself for resorting to physical coercion by charging an offender with resisting arrest." He also found that resisting arrest was not even charged when circumstances had warranted it and he attributed this to the perception by many officers that resistance was only

⁹ It was unknown if the suspects were ever formally charged with refusing, resisting or interfering, since Reiss admitted that he and his associates did not follow the arresting officer(s) to the jail to find out what the exact charges were on the booking sheet.

¹⁰ Croft (1985) found that in 1,012 arrests involving police use of force, 42.2% involved resisting arrest.

a routine part of their job. The frequency of resisting arrest may vary with assignment or the crime rate of the officers' beats. Officers working in high crime areas may be accustomed to minor forms of resistance.

Sykes and Clark's (1980) study in 1970 involved 9,000 citizens and 1,466 encounters with police. They discovered an asymmetrical relationship between officers and citizens. First, police expected lower-class members to defer to them, however, they were not likely to defer to these citizens in return. Second, lower-class whites were more deferent toward police than were lower-class nonwhites. Third, the potential for conflict was lowest when officers confronted upper-class members, as the wealthy and the police deferred to each other. Finally, conflict was highest when officers confronted lower-class nonwhites who had broken the law (Sykes & Clark, 1980).

Domestic Disputes

Most of the first studies of domestic disturbances were conducted through direct observation (Bard & Zacker, 1974; Lundman, 1974). Bard and Zacker (1974) and Lundman (1974) tended to dispel the "myths" surrounding domestic disputes. According to Lundman (1974), domestics were not particularly hazardous; he even described the interactions between police and citizens as "polite."

One of the "myths" may concern alcohol. Bard and Zacker (1974, p. 291) said that "police have tended to emphasize the role of alcohol as a critical factor in family conflicts." However, they found that just one-third to one-half of all domestics involved alcohol use.

Station-house anecdotes may have contributed to some myths surrounding domestic disputes (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1990; Davis, 1981; Dolon et al., 1986; Ellis, 1987; Garner & Clemmer, 1989). Ellis (1987) refers to it as the "domestics-are-most-dangerous-to-police" myth. He states that domestics may account for many assaults and injuries in absolute numbers, however, we do not know how often officers attend these calls. Therefore, we cannot assess their dangers. Ellis also believes that the myth of domestics as dangerous was a product of the government's attempt to win the loyalty of the police during the 1960s and 1970s by showing a disingenuous concern for their safety.

Attending domestic disturbances has been greatly exaggerated. Attending domestic disturbances is not associated with a disproportionate number of deaths and injuries to police officers. (Ellis, 1987, p. 331)

Of 1,388 domestic violence calls observed in New York City, officers (working in a special crisis unit) used physical force to restrain or separate subjects only 1% of the time (Bard & Zacker, 1974). A study conducted in the Midwest found that the potential or actual act of physical violence between police and citizens occurred in 12% of the

calls (Lundman, 1974).¹¹ A recent survey found that 78.4% of the officers said they had been physically assaulted at a domestic dispute at least once during their careers (Friday et al., 1991).

According to Garner and Clemmer (1989), the likelihood of an officer being killed at a domestic dispute is negligible. However, this research has been criticized for how they calculated their danger rates (Choi, 1989; Elliott, 1989; Stanford & Mowry, 1990). Garner and Clemmer analyzed several former studies of violence toward the police and then "fit" these findings with two other studies of police activity rates, i.e., the amount of time officers spent on specific calls.¹² Choi (1989, p. 61) says, "[B]y arbitrarily imposing one set measure derived from one study on another, the precision in estimating the danger rates is in question." Elliott (1989, p. 431) adds, "The procedure used for obtaining harm-activity ratios for the latter estimates is questionable (the estimates of harm and activity used to establish a given ratio are derived from different jurisdictions)." When the studies by Bannon (1976) and Chapman et al. (1974) were reanalyzed by Garner and Clemmer (1989), domestic disputes actually ranked first

¹¹ Lundman (1974, p. 26) defines potential or actual violence as verbal threats, efforts at physical restraint, fighting, making weapons ready for use and/or the use of weapons.

¹² Garner and Clemmer's (1989) estimate of police activity rates were based on studies conducted in Kansas City, MO in 1975 and in three other cities in 1977.

in assaults on officers. However, the authors did not elaborate on this finding except to strike a cautionary note.

Some caution is necessary in rejecting the earlier claim that domestic disturbance calls are among the most dangerous calls to which police respond, if dangerousness is defined broadly to include injury or assault. (Garner & Clemmer, 1989, p. 431)

Robberies appear to be the most hazardous call in terms of police deaths. For every officer who dies responding to a domestic, three die at armed robberies (Ellis, 1987; Margarita, 1980). While robberies are more lethal, assaults and injuries are far more common at domestics (Choi, 1989; Elliot, 1989; Friday et al., 1991; Uchida & Brooks, 1988). According to Buzawa and Buzawa (1990, p. 30):

Officer deaths may be viewed as being a limited measurement of a call's danger, because the occurrence is relatively infrequent. Assaults upon officers are far more common [at domestics].

Recent studies have found that domestics are risky in terms of assaults and injuries (Choi, 1989; Uchida & Brooks, 1988). According to Choi (1989), research which has suggested that the dangers of domestics are exaggerated suffers from both internal and external validity problems.

The challenge lies in the fact that this area has hardly been investigated. However, the price for such a challenge is that there are very few studies to rely on. Of the handful of studies available, virtually all of them are restricted to general assaults and injuries. (Choi, 1989, p. 65)

Choi identified the conditions which were likely to result in police injuries at domestics in Ontario, Canada.

Using cross-tabular analyses of several situational variables, Choi (1989) found that arrest, type of dwelling, demeanor of principals, number of officers, and officer prepared were all related to officer injuries (see Table 1). Individual or personal attributes of officers (e.g., rank, years of service, sex and age) were insignificant.¹³ Choi did not examine race or socioeconomic status (SES) of the officers or the violators.

Using multiple regression, Choi (1989) found that police arrest, victim injury, detached house, alleged assault, and hostile suspect were all statistically significant (see Table 2). However, victim injuries were inversely related to officer injuries. Choi calls this finding "puzzling and totally unexpected," and he believes it may be the result of the abusers having fled from the scene before officers arrived when victims were injured. Lone officer (officer responds to the domestic call alone) and officer preparation were both insignificant. However, because they came close to significance, Choi cautions that they should not be rejected, especially given the sample size.¹⁴

¹³ This table is not shown here. However, Choi (1989) found that the differences between officers who were injured and those who were not injured at domestics was not more than 5% on each personal attribute.

¹⁴ P values for these two variables were not provided. The explained variance (R Squared) was unreported by Choi, although the overall regression model was significant ($p = .001$).

Individual characteristics of officers (e.g., rank, years of service, sex, height, weight and age) were not significant in either crosstabular or regression analyses (Choi, 1989). These variables were also insignificant in previous studies of the police use of lethal and non-lethal force (Friedrich, 1980; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979; Taylor-Greene, 1988; but see Blumberg, 1985, or Croft, 1985 for some contrary findings).

According to Choi (1989), "who called the police?" (neighbor or victim) did not influence the decision to arrest. However, this variable was not examined for a relationship with police injuries. Since Choi focused on injuries and not on assaults, his sample was not as large as it might have been ($n = 324$). For example, only one in five assaults on officers in a Baltimore County study resulted in any injuries (Uchida & Brooks, 1988).

Choi's discovery that alcohol was not related to police-citizen violence differs from most other research (Croft, 1985; Friedrich, 1980; Henley, 1987; Reiss, 1974). However, he did find that suspect drinking was related to the officers' decision to arrest. Police officers who arrested at domestic disputes were more likely to be injured (Choi, 1989). This may have significant training and policy implications, given the current trend toward proarrest (Dunford, 1992; Hirschel & Hutchison, 1992). Choi stated:

Table 1: Situational Variables and Officer Injuries
(Crosstabular Analyses)

<u>Situational Variables</u>		<u>Injured Officers</u>		<u>Non-Injured Officers</u>		<u>Total Cases</u>
		#	%	#	%	
Type *** Dwelling	Detached House	11	8	135	92	146
	Other	23	19	99	81	122
Alleged assault	Yes	30	14	182	86	212
	No	7	9	70	91	77
Injury to victim	Yes	19	11	150	89	169
	No	18	15	100	85	118
Weapon involved	Yes	10	18	46	82	56
	No	27	12	206	88	233
Alcohol involved	Yes	30	13	210	87	240
	No	5	11	40	89	45
Hostile *** principals	Yes	24	19	103	81	127
	No	13	8	150	92	163
Number of * officers	One	7	22	25	78	32
	More	30	11	236	89	266
Officer ** prepared	Yes	21	10	187	90	208
	No	16	20	63	80	79
Arrest **	Yes	22	18	104	82	126
	No	13	8	149	92	162

*** Significant at .01 level

** Significant at .05 level

* Chi-square = 2.1, p = .15

Source: Alfred Choi, Policing Domestic Disturbances: Police Responses and Risks, Ph.D. dissertation, York University, 1989.

Table 2: Situational Variables and Officer Injuries
(Regression Model)

Situational Variable	Regression Coefficient	t-Value
* Detached house	-.113	-2.82
* Alleged assault	.106	2.05
** Injury to victim	-.128	-2.76
Weapon involved	.004	.08
Alcohol involved	.029	.52
* Hostile principal	.100	2.45
Lone officer	.128	1.93
Officer prepared	-.088	-1.94
** Arrest	.123	2.85

Note:

* P < .05

F = 4.52

P = .001

** P < .01

Source: Alfred Choi, Policing Domestic Disturbances: Police Responses and Risks, Ph.D. dissertation, York University, 1989.

Arrest is clearly shown to have significant effects on police injury and is the best predictor of all situational variables. The probability of the officer being injured increases by 12.3% if the officer decides to arrest the suspect. (1989, p. 115)

Choi (1989) used two social-psychological theories, the practicality thesis and the patriarchy thesis, to try to explain police-citizen encounters. The practicality thesis examines the police reluctance to arrest, given both organizational and criminal justice demands (e.g., the need to be accessible for more "important" calls, seriousness of

the offense, lack of victim's assistance).¹⁵ The patriarchy thesis focuses on male stereotypes about the victims' role in domestic violence and the male social order (Gelles & Cornell, 1990). Choi found greater support for a practicality thesis. Both of these theories focused on arrests and not officer assaults or injuries.

Uchida and Brooks (1988) examined 1,550 assaults of police officers in Baltimore County, MD from 1984 to 1986. They discovered that domestic disputes accounted for only 5.3% of police activity, but 25% of all the assaults of officers. More than 21% of these assaults resulted in injuries to an officer. According to Uchida and Brooks:

While recent research studies indicate that domestic disturbances are not as dangerous as originally believed, our data show that domestics present a high risk of danger to police, at least in terms of assaults. (1988. p. 101)

Choi (1989), Elliott (1989) and Uchida and Brooks (1988) all believe Garner and Clemmer (1989) were premature in de-emphasizing the dangers of domestic disputes.

Uchida and Brooks (1988) found that handcuffing and struggling with suspects were less likely to precede assaults than were investigating and resolving disputes. These categories were rather vague and were not discussed in great detail by the authors. Injured officers may have been

¹⁵ Buzawa and Buzawa (1990) advise that an arrest is less likely if the domestic occurs at the end of the officer's shift because this means the officer would have to stay late.

caught off guard or may not have been prepared. According to Grennan:

Officers responding to a less overtly threatening situation (family dispute, disorderly man, and so on) are not always prepared to face a violent conflict in which they may be assaulted and injured. An officer, due to laxity or the unanticipated confrontation, can become an easy target of an assailant. (1987, p. 81)

Other studies, however, have concluded that attempting to arrest and handcuffing suspects were more dangerous activities for officers (Choi, 1989; Henley, 1987; Margarita, 1980).

Uchida and Brooks (1988) compared domestics with non-domestics. For example, they found that assaults on officers at domestics were more likely to occur indoors than was the case for non-domestic assaults. However, they did not examine why some domestics resulted in violence between officers and citizens while others were resolved without overt conflict.

There are very few studies to rely on when examining police assaults and injuries at domestic disputes (Choi, 1989). This appears to be even more obvious if only theoretical research is considered. The use of Turk's (1966, 1969) theory in this dissertation is an attempt to fill that void. It not only attempts to predict the kinds of conditions which increase the potential for overt conflict but offers an explanatory framework which can integrate various research findings.

In sum, the evidence provided by previous studies on the dangers of policing domestics is varied. While several researchers have maintained that domestics are very hazardous (Choi, 1989; Elliott, 1989; Friday et al., 1991; Uchida & Brooks, 1988), others seem to believe that these risks are overstated (Bard & Zacker, 1974; Ellis, 1987; Garner & Clemmer, 1989). How "danger" is operationalized may be one of the obstacles. The studies which have focused exclusively on the deaths of officers have concluded that domestics were not dangerous; however, those that have also looked at minor assaults and/or injuries have found that domestics were indeed hazardous.¹⁶ Structural and situational variables (e.g., type of residence, arrest) rather than individual officer or suspect variables (e.g., rank, sex, age) are generally more predictive of injury at domestics.

Proarrest

During the 1980s, researchers claimed that proarrest policies at domestic disputes significantly reduced the recidivism rate of batterers (Berk & Newton, 1985; Sherman & Berk, 1984; Sherman & Cohn, 1989). Recently, however, studies have questioned this relationship. According to

¹⁶ In a study of violence toward police officers in Baltimore County, MD, Uchida and Brooks (1988) found that domestic disputes were less likely to involve firearms than were non-domestic calls; however, they were more likely to involve sharp, blunt, or thrown objects.

Dunford (1992, p. 122), "Arrest in Omaha, by itself, did not appear to deter subsequent domestic conflict. . ." Hirschel and Hutchison (1992, p. 118) found, "arrest is not a significant deterrent for misdemeanor spouse assault" in Charlotte, NC. Other studies in Dade County, FL and in Milwaukee found that arrest actually increased the recidivism rate of batterers when they were unmarried and unemployed (Pate & Hamilton 1992; Sherman & Smith, 1992) indicating the importance of social bonding. Sherman (1992, p. 45) acknowledged, "Undoing the effects of initial results may be much harder than some criminologists imagined."

In a study of Phoenix police officers, Ferraro (1989) found that the department's presumptive arrest policy was being habitually evaded, as police arrested only 18% of the time. "Mandatory and presumptive arrest policies implemented in the absence of change in other parts of the legal system will probably have little lasting impact on how police respond to domestic violence" (Ferraro, 1989, p. 72).¹⁷

While most of the research has focused on recidivism, the unintended consequences of proarrest policies have been overlooked. For example, has proarrest had any effect on police-citizen conflict? Buzawa and Buzawa (1992, p. 214) argue "there is a heightened probability of conflict between

¹⁷ Similar findings were found in Minneapolis, where it was discovered that officers arrested just 20% of the time (Buzawa and Buzawa, 1990).

the officer and the offender and even the victim when the victim does not want arrest." While stating that domestics were rarely fatal for officers in Tampa, FL, Stanford and Mowry (1990, p. 248) admit, "departments with pro-arrest policies in domestic disturbance situations may demonstrate a different potential for assault." Several researchers have found a relationship between officer assaults and arrest (Choi, 1989; Henley, 1987; Margarita, 1980). In Duluth, MN, however, police injuries reportedly went from 15 to 0 after a mandatory arrest policy was implemented (Buel, 1988).¹⁸ According to Buel, abusers are less inclined to commit assaults on police officers if they know that the officers are following a "strict legal duty imposed by law" (1988, p. 221).

The Limitations of Past Research

Past studies of police-citizen conflict have had problems related to (1) external validity, (2) data sources, (3) failure to use control variables or multivariate models, and (4) the absence of theory to identify variables and explain results.

Most of the research has traditionally been conducted at a single police department (Croft, 1985; Fyfe, 1989;

¹⁸ The Duluth mandatory arrest policy began in 1982. After several telephone conversations in the Autumn of 1991 with a Duluth Police Department Crime Prevention Sergeant (who advised he was instrumental in the study mentioned), these figures could not be verified.

Geller & Karales, 1981, 1982; Margarita, 1980; Stanford & Mowry, 1989; Uchida & Brooks, 1988). Given the sometimes potent influence of local cultures on criminal justice phenomena, caution must be used in interpreting these findings and offering generalizations.

Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) have been the sole data source of many police researchers (Kania & Mackey, 1977; Konstantin, 1984; Matulia, 1978; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979; Taylor-Greene, 1988). However, they generally provide little detail and are not immune from politics and embellishment. According to Hagan (1982, p. 52), "Crime rates have a mysterious way of dropping if required for political purposes" (see also Sherman & Langworthy, 1979). Although susceptible to reporter bias (Donahue, 1983), departmental offense/incident reports provide a superior source of information for research.¹⁹

Many of the studies of police-citizen conflict have been descriptive or have examined bivariate relationships (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Croft, 1985; Donahue, 1983; Fyfe, 1981; Geller & Karales, 1982; Uchida & Brooks, 1988). Since

¹⁹ In addition, national level data often use the state or city as the unit of analysis. Differences within cities cannot be examined this way. Peterson and Bailey (1988, p. 216) admit, "Although states are heterogenous in comparison to counties, SMSAs, and cities, it is not possible to conduct the analysis at a lower level of aggregation because police homicide figures provided by the FBI cannot be disaggregated below state level for all the jurisdictions and years under consideration."

multivariate analyses or control variables were not used, these findings may prove to be spurious.

When researchers have provided theories of police-citizen violence, they are often left undeveloped or are too difficult to assess (Sherman, 1980). However, some studies have applied interactionist theories (Bannon, 1976; Choi, 1989; Margarita, 1980; Toch, 1977) and economic conflict theory to this phenomenon (Chamlin, 1989; Jacobs, 1979; Jacobs & Britt, 1978; Kania & Mackey, 1977). Economic conflict theory, however, has been criticized for being unclear and difficult to evaluate for this problem (Orcutt, 1983; Sherman, 1980). Orcutt (1983, p. 334) stated, "some of these theories are so vague and so deficient in specific empirical implications that it is unclear what kinds of evidence would be required for their assessment."

CHAPTER 3 TURK ON NORM RESISTANCE

Theoretical Framework

Austin Turk has been cited as, "the deviance theorist who has persisted longest in an effort to develop a non-Marxist framework for the analysis of conflict processes" (Orcutt, 1983, p. 321). Turk (1966, 1969) has focused on the process of criminalization and the relationship between authorities and subjects. Authorities are the decision-makers and subjects are those affected by the decisions.

Subjects are empirically distinguished from authorities by their inability to influence the legal processes of norm creation or enforcement. (Turk, 1969, p. 33)

As such, authority relations are inevitable according to Turk and so the potential for conflict is inherent. Not all authorities have an equal opportunity to act or influence the law. Turk (1969) views the "firstline enforcers," as those who have the greatest impact on criminality. Although the norms of deference and submission maintain the balance of the authority-subject relationship, in specific situations, authorities must rely on coercive means to gain compliance; Turk refers to this as "nightstick law."

Sellin (1938) has argued that criminality is the result of cultural distinctions. Specific offenders may not know or may not accept specific legal norms. Turk also discusses the variations in the cultural norms of authorities and subjects.

The greater the cultural difference between the evaluator and the violator, the less likely are psychological sanctions which assume a capacity and readiness to subtle cues to get through to the violator, and therefore sanctioning will have to be more physically coercive in order to enforce the norm. (Turk, 1966, p. 345)

Non-violent forms of persuasion (e.g., body language, verbal statements) by officers may be insufficient to gain the compliance of those who adhere to unlike norms. For example, when police encounter subjects of a different culture, age, sex, or race, the probability of overt conflict should increase (Turk, 1966; 1969).¹ Turk states that conflict is more likely when there are "interactions and relations between people and others not of their own kind" (1969, p. 285).

Turk's conflict theory has gone through several revisions (Orcutt, 1983). Norm resistance may be applied to situations "within" the authority structure itself. For example, Turk (1966, p. 343) states, "specific persons in official law enforcement agencies, as well as persons in purportedly criminal populations and organizations, may be

¹ Norm resistance and overt conflict will be used interchangeably throughout the discussion of police-citizen exchanges.

in either the law-enforcing or the law-resistant party in empirical instances." It follows that officers who fail to comply with the policies of their departments are acting as resisters (Turk, 1966). Some attributes may be less distasteful to lower-level enforcers (i.e., patrol officers), while they may be highly offensive to management (i.e., chiefs and captains). Ferraro's (1989) study of Phoenix police officers illustrates an example of this phenomenon as most patrol officers failed to comply with the department's arrest policy.² While Turk's theory permits the analyses of all types of authority-subject relations, this dissertation focuses primarily on the encounter between authorities (i.e., police) and subjects (i.e., batterers).

In certain structured situations, conflict is more or less likely to occur and it hinges on cultural norms, i.e., statutes, written law, or policies, and social norms, i.e., actual behavior or how a policy is being enforced. The probability of overt conflict is greatest when there is congruence between cultural and social norms, since conflict is inherent in the structure of the authority-subject relationship. When officers comply with a proarrest policy at domestics, the likelihood of conflict with subjects

² Turk (1969, p. 39) said, "no norm enforcer (e.g., policeman, judge, priest, elder) can be fully aware of and able to control all that conditions his own behavior, implying that his behavior will always differ somewhat at least from what he and others expect and believe it to be." In an earlier essay, Turk (1966, p. 345) stated, "only rarely will announcers and enforcers be the same persons."

should increase. If authorities and subjects both hold to dissimilar beliefs and act in accord with these beliefs, there is no room left for compromise. However, conflict is less likely when cultural and social norms are incongruent. Here, although cultural beliefs clash, authorities and subjects do not practice what they preach. Turk (1969, p. 56) states, "neither party is very prone to fight over an essentially meaningless set of symbols."

Turk (1969) describes four basic structural situations affecting the probability of authority-subject conflict and each situation has a different potential for conflict. These situations are: (1) the congruence of norms for both authorities and subjects (high-high), (2) the congruence of norms for subjects but not authorities (high-low), (3) the congruence of norms for authorities but not subjects (high-low), and (4) the congruence of norms for neither authorities or subjects (low-low). In 2 and 3, the probability of conflict falls into the middle ranges; however, conflict is more likely if it is the authorities' cultural and social norms that are congruent because the authorities are more intolerant than subjects in accepting differences.

Flagrant, persistent disregard for the law will, nevertheless, force authorities to act to demonstrate that they are still in charge, that they are still able to assert their will against resistance in a showdown. (Turk, 1969, p. 64)

In the event that cultural norms conflict, both authorities and subjects appeal to their own separate standards. While authorities are likely to appeal to legal norms (e.g., the law or policies), subjects are likely to appeal to non-legal norms (e.g., natural law, the right to privacy).

Conflict between authorities and subjects is also related to organization (Turk, 1969). Organization is determined by both the "complexity of the relationship" and by "social support."

When an attribute or act has been integrated into a system of relationships, implying that it is a part of some role which the individual performs, then we can expect that some kind and degree of coercion will be required to break the behavior pattern. (Turk, 1969, p. 58)

Authorities are organized "by definition," since the authority structure implies a significant degree of organization by the more powerful members of society (Turk, 1969).³ However, subjects may or may not be highly organized. The greater group or social support subjects have for their actions, the less likely they will be to compromise with the authorities. Turk (1969) also mentions "complexity" in his discussion of organization. Activities or behaviors that are more complex (rather than simple) are more organized and harder to break by the authorities.

³ Turk (1969) admits to variation in the organization of authorities, although this does not necessarily undermine its organized character.

An individual who has group support for his behavior is going to be more stubborn in the face of efforts to make him change than is someone who has only himself as an ally. (Turk, 1969, p. 58)

Turk (1969) defines sophistication as the "knowledge used in order to manipulate others." The likelihood of overt conflict is lessened when subjects or authorities are sophisticated.

Sophisticated norm resisters are more accurate in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their position relative to authorities, and consequently better able to avoid open warfare with the superior enemy. (Turk, 1969, p. 59)

Sophisticated subjects are less likely to engage the powerful authorities in battle. Authorities who are sophisticated are also able to achieve their goals without physical violence.⁴ Turk sees greater variation in the levels of sophistication than organization [for authorities].

Clearly, sophistication is a prerequisite for enduring authority; so it could be argued that just as authority implies organization, it also implies sophistication. However, control agencies demonstrably vary a great deal in the extent to which their policies and practices are affected by appreciation of the need for knowledge. (1969, p. 61)

The various combinations of organization and sophistication lead to different probabilities of conflict within the respective congruence and incongruence conditions

⁴ Muir (1980, p. 52) states, "It is important to appreciate the unusual skills of eloquence which policemen in authority need if they are going to escape the violence implied by the neighborhood beef." He emphasizes the need for language skills and police training.

discussed above. This results in a matrix (see Table 3). Note that the probability of conflict is highest whenever subjects are organized and both authorities and subjects are unsophisticated.

Turk cautions that the cells in his matrix (see Table 3 below) do not represent empirical observations but only relative probabilities of conflict:

[W]e do not know just how unlikely is conflict in this minimum chance situation. . . All that can be postulated is that this will be the lowest value of the 32 possibilities and that the value will be somewhere above .00, because the authorities are, after all, on public record against an attribute actually found in some part of the population. (Turk, 1969, p. 63).

Critiques of Turk's Theory

Turk's (1966, 1969) theory has been criticized by both radical conflict theorists and consensus criminologists. His effort to create a value neutral conflict theory has been considered overly submissive, illusory, deterministic, abstract and tautological (Gibbons, 1979; Orcutt, 1979; Taylor et al., 1973).

In a discussion of Turk's theory, Taylor et al. call it, "one of permanent adjustment of the subordinate to the powerful under present social arrangements" (1973, p. 251).⁵ Since radical theorists profess to affiliate with

⁵ Gibbons (1979, p. 170) argues that Taylor, Walton and Young set up "straw men" who "were laboriously constructed and then demolished. . . and lacked fidelity to the theorists' actual arguments."

Table 3: Expected Relative Probabilities of Normative-Legal Conflict

CONGRUENT SUBJECT	CONGRUENT AUTHORITY*		INCONGRUENT AUTHORITY	
	unsoph.	soph.	unsoph.	soph.
Organized and unsoph.	1**	5	17	21
Unorganized and unsoph.	2	6	18	22
Organized and soph.	3	7	19	23
Unorganized and soph.	4	8	20	24
INCONGRUENT SUBJECT				
Organized and unsoph.	9	13	25	29
Unorganized and unsoph.	10	14	26	30
Organized and soph.	11	15	27	31
Unorganized and soph.	12	16	28	32

* Authorities are organized by definition

** As numbers increase, the probability of overt conflict decreases

Table adapted from Turk (1969, p. 63).

the working classes in resisting the ruling elite, Turk is seen as an ally of the government (Bernard, 1981; Taylor et al., 1973). Gibbons states:

Radical criminologists claim that effective power in American society is wielded by members of a corporate ruling class, which is a very different view from that espoused by mainstream criminologists, including conflict theorists such as Turk, who opt for a pluralistic conception of interest groups and power relationships in modern society. (1979, p. 159)

Taylor et al. (1973) suggest that criminologists pay attention to the origins of conflict, which they see as inequality and social stratification.⁶ However, Turk is less concerned with the origin of conflict than with the conditions in which it becomes overt. According to Turk (1969, p. 41), "people assent to the order because it is built into them through socialization." His theory attempts to explain differential rates of overt conflict between authorities and subjects and the likelihood of criminalization. In the process, Turk does not sound like an apologist for the elite.⁷

"Nightstick law" and "assembly line justice" are commonly experienced by the very weak, and official records are not kept with the same care as in conflicts where the resisters have enough

⁶ Richard Quinney (1980) views crime and criminal behavior as the products of capitalism and social inequality. He sees the role of criminology as rejecting the capitalist order.

⁷ Paul Walton claims that "when you unpack the ambiguous language of Quinney, Turk and Matza, you find that they are by no means as radical as their language would have them appear" (Mintz, 1974, p. 44).

power to demand and get some degree of adherence to procedural norms. With the helpless, enforcers can also be careless because mistakes do not cost much and indeed may cost less than would even-handed justice. (1969, p. 70)

Consensus theorists have criticized Turk for neglecting a significant body of knowledge which has shown that consensus and not conflict characterizes society (Akers, 1979). However, Turk views consensus as only illusory, and more recently stated, "whether they realize it or not, people are inevitably involved in intergroup struggles over who shall have what resources in a finite world" (1982, p. 35).

Radical theorists, like Quinney (1980) and Taylor et al. (1973) reject Turk's position on the inevitability of the authority-subject relationship; and are critical of Turk's approach for being deterministic (Bernard, 1981).

[T]he acts of men who have not been "conditioned to accept the authorities as fact of life" require something more in the way of a description of human consciousness than is allowed by the adoption of the terminology of behaviorist psychology. (Taylor et al., 1973, p. 249)

The "condition" relevant to Turk's theory lies in his discussion of norms of deference--something that was not specifically developed. The criticism is less germane to Turk's discussion of the structured circumstances in which these norms of deference will not check the inherent conflict. Indeed, the probabilities for conflict presented in Table 3 above are largely independent of whether subjects are "conditioned to accept authorities."

The role of determinism (as one of the hallmarks of positivistic science) is disputed even as it applied to radical conflict theories. While Groves (1985) states that radicals are hostile toward positivism, Bernard (1981) believes that Marx himself was a positivist describing the objective processes of history. Like Dahrendorf (1959), Turk views inequality as a fact and its elimination as idealistic. Turk would probably not be too concerned if others see his efforts to explicate conflict in authority relations as being deterministic.

Turk's level of abstraction has raised concerns about tautology in his basic conflict formulation. For example, the assertion that systems of control serve the needs of authorities seems true by definition (Orcutt, 1983, p. 334). So does the assertion that "lawbreaking is taken to be an indicator of the failure or lack of authority; it is a measure of the extent to which rulers and ruled, decision-makers and decision-acceptors, are not bound together in a stable authority relationship" (Turk, 1969, p. 48). Taylor et al. have argued that Turk's overall abstraction exaggerates what are really modest theoretical contributions.

[T]he fact that the young, the masculine, and the members of minority racial groups are more likely than most to be criminalized . . . [makes Turk's theory] superficially relevant. (1973, p. 246)

One of the purposes of this study is to demonstrate how Turk's theory may be applied in ways that hold policy and

theoretical significance. The challenge must be to convert abstract concepts into concrete operationalizations, so they may be tested and subjected to falsification.⁸ Akers (1977) maintains that even conceptual tautologies can provide the foundation for testable hypotheses. Police-citizen interactions at domestic disputes provides a situation where specific hypotheses may be advanced.

Turk's Conflict Theory at Domestic

Recall that Turk (1969) focused on "specific structured situations" and not on social psychological meanings. He stated that in order to understand conflict, "A sociological theory of interaction is required. . . [and] it must be [one] of interaction among groups. . . rather than a social psychological explanation of patterns in interactions. . . even though psychological assumptions [are] implicit in any such theory" (Turk, 1969, p. 53).

Turk hypothesizes that under conditions of dissensus, conflict is most likely to become overt when both authorities and the subjects behave consistently with their cultural norms. For example, males who in thought and deed consider themselves to be the "masters of their houses" cannot be expected to defer to police who view spouse abuse

⁸ In an early discussion of norm resistance, Turk explains that his propositions are only a "rough first approximation of a theory that will hopefully offer not only plausible but precise, systematic, and therefore testable explanations of criminality and punishment" (1966, p. 347).

as plainly criminal. The domestic dispute call places authorities in positions where they must confront general American privacy norms about the family and the home that are combined with norms of male dominance. According to Bard and Zacker (1974, p. 290):

Intervening officers are in an extremely sensitive situation, one which lends them to being seen as outside "intruders" (and, particularly, with power and authority) into the sacrosanct domain of the home. The dilemma for the police officer is that, although he has been summoned, he moves into highly volatile emotional "territory." His presence in the home can be regarded as either helpful or threatening. Clearly, under such circumstances, there are enormous potentials for either insight or incite.

Turk assumes there is a potential for conflict between authorities and subjects. Bard and Zacker graphically detail how this potential for conflict applies to the domestic call. However, Turk saw some circumstances where this basic conflict is more pronounced and where conflict was more likely to become overt. When cultural differences are greater, the potential for conflict increases (culture conflict) and it will be most likely to become overt when authorities and subjects act congruently with their own respective norms (congruence of norms and behavior).

Prior criminal behavior and arrests demonstrate the willingness for subjects to oppose the normative order. Although we usually cannot measure the norms they hold directly, we might expect these subjects to have developed an oppositional philosophy and to be more likely to offer

resistance when confronted by control agents. In a discussion of Turk's theory, Vold and Bernard (1986, p. 281) stated, "The probability of conflict will be greatest when subjects have a full blown language and philosophy with which to defend their behavior." As indicated in FBI data, 70% of the subjects who killed police officers between 1980 and 1989 had a previous arrest and 20% were on probation or parole at the time of the homicide (Boylen & Little, 1990; Major, 1991). Donahue (1983) found suspects who were shot by police averaged 2.63 felony arrests prior to the shooting event.⁹ The initial hypothesis of this dissertation relates to circumstances where there may be greater conflict between subjects and authorities inherent in the situation so that there is a greater likelihood for overt resistance.

H1 Overt conflict between authorities and subjects will be more likely when subjects have a criminal arrest history.

If a prior arrest was for a crime of violence or disorder (e.g., domestic violence, assault, battery, interfering with police, disorderly conduct, refusing to obey, resisting arrest, robbery, homicide), the probability of authority-subject conflict should be greater.¹⁰ The

⁹ The majority of the subjects shot by police officers in Kansas City, MO and Atlanta, GA had been previously arrested (Blumberg, 1983).

¹⁰ Disorderly conduct was included under crimes of violence or disorder since the police often place this charge on subjects who were verbally abusive and aggressive toward officers and others present. The following was taken from a domestic dispute call which occurred in the City of

next hypothesis concerns the potential for conflict and the congruence of the subjects' cultural and social norms.

H2 Overt conflict between authorities and subjects will be more likely when subjects have a criminal record involving an arrest for a crime of violence or disorder.

Recall that Turk also argued that coercion and control would vary by the extent of cultural differences.

Indicators of cultural differences are numerous and may include differences in the age, sex, and race of subjects (suspects) and of authorities (police). Turk states that authorities and subjects must "learn and continually re-learn to interact with one another as, respectively, occupants of superior and inferior statuses and performers of dominating and submitting roles" (1969, pp. 41-42).

According to Martin (1993), officers sometimes face deference reversals, where citizens refuse to acknowledge the officers' official status but instead focus on age, sex or race. Since the norms of deference are crucial in maintaining the balance of the authority-subject relationship, it is less likely that older subjects who assault their family members will acquiesce to younger officers. Therefore, the following hypothesis relates

Charleston. "[Officer] . . . attempted to speak with the suspect when the complainant became even more abusive and loud. She started yelling profanities and a crowd started gathering. She was advised by [officer] that if she did not control herself that she would be placed under arrest for being disorderly." This narrative conforms to the author's personal experiences as a patrol officer and sergeant with the Albuquerque, NM Police Department.

conflict with differences in the age of the officers and the subjects.

- H3 Overt conflict between authorities and subjects will be more likely when subjects are over 30 years of age and officers are under 30 years of age.

The potential for overt conflict should be higher when nonwhite officers encounter white subjects who are law violators. In this situation, not only are there cultural differences, but deference norms which maintain the authority-subject balance may be in jeopardy.¹¹ The following hypothesis relates differences in the race of authorities and subjects.

- H4 Overt conflict will be more likely when officers are nonwhite and subjects are white.

According to Turk (1969), it is the learning of superior and inferior stations and of dominating and submitting roles which maintains the authority-subject balance. Male subjects who view themselves as the "rulers of their castle" may not readily defer to female officers who are mandated to arrest at domestics. Martin (1993, p. 338) said, "By virtue of their office, female officers expect deference to their position from citizens; by virtue of their female status they are subordinates of men." Therefore, the next hypothesis relates conflict with gender differences of the officer and the subject.

¹¹ Turk (1969, p. 61) explains, "[Overt c]onflict is greater [when] the basis of legitimacy is the social norm of deference rather than 'norm internalization,' or consensus."

- H5 Overt conflict will be more likely when officers are female and subjects are male.

For Turk (1969) sophistication referred to "Knowledge used . . . to manipulate others." Several researchers have found that less experienced officers are more likely to be assaulted and to use physical force (Bannon, 1976; Bard & Zacker, 1974; Blumberg, 1983; Croft, 1985; Muir, 1980; Uchida & Brooks, 1988). According to Muir (1980, p. 52), "It is important to appreciate the unusual skills of eloquence which policemen in authority need if they are going to escape violence implied by the neighborhood beef." More experienced officers should possess greater sophistication in handling sensitive calls, such as domestics. However, officers who are "not trained in intervention subtleties may provoke aggressive, territorial responses in citizens" (Bard & Zacker, 1974, p. 290).¹² The following hypothesis relates norm resistance with the officers' professional experience--an indicator of their sophistication.

- H6 Overt conflict will be more likely when officers have 48 months or less of police experience.

Croft (1985) found that younger police officers were more likely to be involved in use of force calls. Blumberg (1983) also discovered younger officers were involved in more deadly force incidents than older officers. Uchida and

¹² Turk (1969, p. 60) cites Trebach (1964) who found that the FBI is less prone to violence than state and local officers because of their superior training.

Brooks (1988) determined that younger officers were at a greater risk of being assaulted as well. While these findings may reflect differential assignments or "bad" shifts of younger officers, it may also reflect their abilities, skills or sophistication (Fyfe, 1978; Swanton, 1985). It is less likely that younger officers have the sophistication of older officers in defusing potentially explosive encounters. The following hypothesis relates officer age (as a indicator of sophistication) with norm resistance.

- H7 Overt conflict will be more likely when officers are under the age of 30.

Another indicator of subject sophistication is the use of alcohol or drugs. Intoxicated subjects who have assaulted their spouses should be less capable of manipulating officers when confronted with their behavior. From Turk's theory, suspect intoxication is a predictor of sophistication; much of the research is consistent with this hypothesis (Croft, 1985; Friedrich, 1980; Henley, 1987; Reiss, 1974; Uchida & Brooks, 1988; but see Choi, 1989 for contrary findings). The following hypothesis relates to subject sophistication and intoxication.

- H8 Overt conflict will be more likely when subjects are intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Although citizen-to-citizen violence has usually terminated by the time officers arrive, police-citizen conflict is more probable if the dispute is still in-

progress (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989). In this situation, both authorities and subjects have less opportunity to develop plans or strategies (Fyfe, 1989a); their efforts will be less sophisticated. Therefore, this hypothesis results:

H9 Overt conflict will be more likely when the domestic dispute is in-progress when police arrive at the call.

When officers are sent to a domestic dispute call, the police radio dispatcher often provides valuable information (e.g., weapons present, suspect intoxication, prior calls to that location, victim injuries).¹³ However, there are situations where officers observe disputes while they are patrolling (on sight) or simply drive up on them.¹⁴ In these instances, officers often have less information and less time to prepare themselves (Scharf & Binder, 1983) and so will have lower sophistication. The next hypothesis relates to authority sophistication and how the domestic dispute came to the attention of the police.

H10 Overt conflict will be more likely when the police receive the domestic as an on-view rather than a dispatch call.

Recall that for Turk the dimensions of organization are complexity and social support. Turk (1969) argues that the more an attribute or an act has been integrated into a

¹³ Proactive interventions are likely to be in progress and outside.

¹⁴ In a discussion on police-citizen violence, Scharf and Binder (1983, p. 83) stated, "[An] advantage of dispatched encounters is the time available to the officer immediately prior to entry on the scene."

system of relationships, there is greater organization. There is a greater level of social complexity, therefore, when officers challenge the authority of a "head-of-household" who has used violence against family members than when they intervene in a dispute between friends or acquaintances. From Turk's analysis, it is predicted:

H11 Overt conflict will be more likely when the disputants are married or related to each other rather than acquaintances.

Victims of assault who are unemployed may grant more support to the batterer due to financial or emotional dependence. Victims have been known to intervene on the side of the batterer or refuse to prosecute after police arrive. In San Diego, in spite of a special police domestic violence unit (made up of 21 officers), 60% of the victims refused to participate in prosecuting their batterers (Benson, 1993). Thus, the following hypothesis relates to the organization of the subject.

H12 Overt conflict will be more likely when the victims are unemployed.

Another consideration is the visibility of injuries. Whatever makes a dispute more visible alters how it is interpreted and the potential for support. The organization of the subjects should be reduced when their victims are visibly injured, since the subjects are likely to have less social support for their behavior and resistance is less realistic. The result is likely to be a decrease in overt

conflict with police. Therefore, the following hypothesis refers to subject organization in terms of victim injuries.

H13 Overt conflict will be more likely when the victims do not have visible injuries.

Turk (1969, p. 58) explained that, "An individual who has group support for his behavior is going to be more stubborn in the face of efforts to make him change than is someone who has only himself as an ally." When police arrest more than one individual, the potential for conflict should be greater, since more potential opposition now exists. According to Buzawa and Buzawa (1992), police-citizen conflict may be related to dual arrests, especially if there is a mandatory arrest policy. Thus, the following hypothesis is related to the degree of organization in terms of the number of persons arrested.

H14 Overt conflict will be more likely when more than one person is arrested at the dispute.

Domestic disputes which are visible to a wider public are inherently more complex. According to Muir (1980), police-citizen encounters in front of crowds present difficulties for managing such situations. "A policeman who attempts to restore order at the expense of a citizen's honor leaves the citizen no recourse but to attack" (Muir, 1980, p. 48). The same may be true for authorities, as Friedrich (1980) found visibility had a substantial impact on police-citizen violence. "Police sometimes rely on force to demonstrate their authority and protect their image, and

these things are in greater jeopardy when more people are around" (Friedrich, 1980, p. 91). In Rochester, NY, witnesses failed to support police in 18.9% of the calls and in 17% of the calls, they actually attempted to help the suspect by stopping police from arresting (Croft, 1985). The following two hypotheses relate to organization in terms of witnesses and the location of the dispute.

H15 Overt conflict will be more likely when witnesses are present.

H16 Overt conflict will be more likely when the dispute occurs in public.

The probability of overt conflict should be greater if the domestic dispute was a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Croft (1985, p. 69) found, "both numerically and proportionately use of physical force incidents involve misdemeanor and violation offenses." Reiss (1974) found that subjects were more likely to offer resistance at misdemeanor arrests because of their perception that the law was being unjustly applied to them, as others avoided arrest for similar acts. Therefore, when the domestic assault is a misdemeanor, subjects are likely to believe they have more social support (organization). The following hypothesis relates to organization in terms of the level of criminal offense.

H17 Overt conflict will be likely when the domestic assault is a misdemeanor rather than a felony.

The real world is quite different from the scientific laboratory, and it is unlikely that human relations can be

understood by the examination of a single variable. Several indicators of Turk's culture conflict, sophistication and organization themes are likely to be involved in each domestic encounter between officers and citizens. In general, the greater the number of indicators of Turks' norm resistance theory, the greater the potential for police-citizen conflict. In multivariate analysis, indicators of sophistication should have more impact on norm resistance than the organization indicators according to Turk. "The available evidence suggests that skill in avoiding head-on collisions in social interaction is more crucial than the degree of organization in affecting the chance of authorities-subjects conflict" (Turk, 1969, p. 59). Accordingly, variables related to sophistication (e.g., intoxication, officer age, officer experience, on view encounters and how the call came to the attention of officers) should have more explanatory value than the organization variables (e.g., victim injuries, location, victim employment, witnesses present, number arrested, seriousness of charge). Thus the following hypotheses are provided:

- H18 Overt conflict will be more likely when there are a greater number of indicators of culture conflict, organization and a lack of sophistication at the dispute.
- H19 Overt conflict will be more likely when there is a lack of sophistication rather than when there is greater organization.

Turk (1969) hypothesized that under conditions of normative dissensus, conflict was more likely to become overt when both authorities and the subjects acted consistently with their cultural norms.¹⁵ Congruence on the part of authorities is somewhat more predictive than congruence of the subject (see Table 3 above). To the extent that presumptive or mandatory arrest policies are achieved, authority's cultural and social norms become more congruent. Turk would predict greater overt conflict between subjects and police in such a circumstance. Thus, the last hypothesis concerns the cultural and social norms of the authorities.

H20 Overt conflict will be more likely when the police department has a proarrest policy in place.

Turk's theory has given rise to 20 hypotheses-- something which by itself counters his detractors, who complained about theoretical abstraction and tautology. Those hypotheses are recapitulated below and the Turk theme which each addresses is included in parentheses. In sum, authority-subject conflict is most likely to become overt when:

¹⁵ When the police department has a proarrest policy, cultural and social norms should become congruent [if there is compliance with the policy]. However, subjects may not act consistently with their own cultural norms. In this situation, the probability of norm resistance would be somewhere in the highest 50% of Turk's matrix (from 1 to 16), and would depend on the sophistication and organization indicators (see Table 3).

- (1) Subjects have an arrest history for any type of crime (culture conflict and the congruence of norms and behavior);
- (2) Subjects have an arrest history for a crime of violence or disorder (culture conflict and the congruence of norms and behaviors);
- (3) Officers are less than 30 years old and subjects are over 30 years old (culture conflict);
- (4) Officers race is nonwhite and subjects race is white (culture conflict);
- (5) Officers gender is female and subjects gender is male (culture conflict);
- (6) Officers have no more than 48 months of police experience (sophistication of authorities);
- (7) Officers are under 30 years old (sophistication of authorities);
- (8) Subjects are intoxicated (sophistication of subjects);
- (9) The domestic dispute is still in progress when police arrive (sophistication of authorities and subjects);
- (10) Officers receive the domestic dispute on view rather than through the police dispatcher (sophistication of authorities);
- (11) Disputants are married or relatives (organization of subjects);
- (12) Victims are unemployed at the time of the call (organization of subjects);
- (13) Victims do not have visible injuries (organization of subjects);
- (14) Multiple arrests are made at the dispute (organization of subjects);
- (15) Witnesses are present at the dispute (organization of subjects);
- (16) The dispute occurs in a public area rather than within a dwelling (organization of subjects);
- (17) The citizen-to-citizen assault is a misdemeanor rather than a felony (organization of subjects);

- (18) There are a greater number of indicators of culture conflict, organization and a lack of sophistication present (culture conflict, sophistication and organization);
- (19) Authorities and subjects are less sophisticated rather than more organized (sophistication of authorities and of subjects and the organization of subjects);
- (20) The police department has a presumptive arrest policy in place (congruence of norms).

CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The unit of analysis for this research is police-citizen encounters at domestic disturbances. Two research sites were chosen: The Charleston, SC Police Department and Savannah, GA Police Department. The sampling frame consists of official police reports from both the Charleston Police (January 1, 1988, through Dec. 31, 1991) and Savannah Police (January 1, 1987, through February 28, 1988). Calls for service where officers were dispatched to a domestic dispute but did not write a report were not included in the study. Many of these calls were considered "unfounded" by the officers or else the complainant could not be located.

There are several limitations in using police incident reports (Croft, 1985; Donahue, 1983; Fyfe, 1981). Since official reports detailing police-citizen encounters may be used for supervisor monitoring, disciplining, or civil lawsuits, officers no doubt cast themselves in the most favorable light. In addition, Croft (1985, p. 53) stated, "[I]t can be expected that some dynamics of the actual situation may be forgotten or overlooked." However, police reports are likely to be as informative as personal

interviews with the participants and far superior to many newspaper accounts.¹

The data collected from the Charleston Police Department were used to address all of the hypotheses with the exception of hypothesis 20, which involves the presumptive arrest policy. Data collected from the Savannah Police Department relate to hypothesis 20 (the congruence of social and cultural norms for authorities). The dependent variable in both of the research locations is norm resistance. This is operationalized as verbal attacks on officers, physical assaults on officers, citizens' refusal to obey a lawful order, resisting arrest, interfering with officers, and the use of force by police (both lethal and non-lethal). The information was obtained from the officers' incident reports themselves and coded as either norm resistance present or not present during the domestic dispute. Incident reports where subjects were described by officers as "belligerent," "uncooperative," "hostile," or "abusive" were considered to be acts of norm resistance, even when formal charges were not generated. As pointed out by Reiss (1974, p. 54), "[B]ooking on a charge of resisting

¹ For example, the news media usually obtains information from the Police Department Public Information Officer. However, it is not uncommon for a story to be incorrect by the time it appears in print or on the air. While the author was a member of the Albuquerque, NM Police Department from 1979 through 1986, he observed this phenomenon regularly.

an arrest or interfering with an arrest, as for all arrests, is a matter of officer discretion."

Charleston, SC

The 1991 population of the city of Charleston, SC was 83,167 residents in 100.08 square miles. Approximately 29.78 square miles are water areas. The racial breakdown of the city was 57.2% white (47,572); 41.6% black (34,597) and 1.2% other (998).² In 1988, there were approximately 250 sworn officers and 100 civilian employees on the department.³ The study period started on January 1, 1988 and concluded on December 31, 1991. The Charleston Police Department had a mandatory arrest policy for domestic disturbances in effect throughout the four years examined.

The data from the Charleston Police Department was used to compare the universe of calls where there was evidence of norm resistance (N = 89) with a sample of calls where no norm resistance was exhibited (n = 81). The Charleston Police Department Planning and Research Unit supplied the author with a computerized listing of all domestic disputes from 1988 through 1991; the bulk of these reports were found on microfilm. All incident reports were read by the author or several research assistants, who worked for the

² This information was acquired from the Charleston Police Department Monthly Report (June, 1992).

³ This information was obtained from a report to Savannah Police Chief David Gellatly (Knoche, 1990).

Charleston Police. Each of these assistants had several years of experience in the department's Records Unit. Periodic checks were made by the author to ensure that the assistants were using standardized procedures.

There were 749 domestic violence reports during the four year study period, the large majority of which involved spouses or cohabitating partners. The population of reports showing norm resistance was selected ($N = 89$). Every sixth case of the remaining reports was collected, the selection being made from a random start. However, many of the "nonresistance" calls had to be discarded for a variety of reasons. Often the batterer had already left by the time officers arrived, so there was not an officer-subject encounter. In other cases, the officer determined that the call was unfounded, so there were no grounds for authority-subject conflict. Only those calls in which potential conflict between officers and subjects was inherent in the encounter were then retained ($N = 81$).

An ex post facto design was used to look at the relationship of several independent variables and norm resistance. According to McMillan and Schumacher (1989, p. 35):

Ex post facto designs are used to compare two or more samples that are comparable except for a specified factor. The possible causes are studied after they have occurred. Rather than manipulating what will happen to subjects, as in experimental designs, the research focuses on what has happened differently for comparable groups of

subjects, then explores if the subjects in each group are different in some way.

It was impossible to determine the frequency of domestic disputes which the Charleston Police Department responded to during the study period. This is because domestics are initially coded by the police radio dispatcher under "general disturbances" (along with parties, neighbor disputes or fight calls) until officers write an incident report. Therefore, the 749 police reports are not indicative of the actual number of dispatches to domestic disturbances. Officers may arrive at a location and decide that there was insufficient evidence to make an arrest or even to write a report. The complainant or victim may have left, or the location may have been wrong. The domestic dispute policy in Charleston states:

The officers will take the assailant into custody for a misdemeanor assault with probable cause, a misdemeanor assault committed in their presence, a felony assault, and an arrest with a warrant (Charleston Police Department, Procedural Order Number 89 - Handling Domestic Dispute Calls).

In addition, according to a Charleston Police Department training memorandum (undated) on domestic violence law:

- a. Where an assault is evident or committed in the officer's presence: an arrest will be made in all cases regardless of the desire of the victim.
- b. Where an assault is alleged by the victim but no physical evidence is present: an arrest will be made if requested by the victim.

Charleston officers are required to write incident reports on all domestic disturbances; however, this does not always occur. For example, the author spent one evening riding with an officer in a downtown area. The officer responded to a domestic dispute call on the street. Both disputants (an older black man and woman) were told to depart in opposite directions. The officer did not write a report; however, there were no visible injuries to either disputant.⁴

Police reports list the type of offense and the individual characteristics of the suspect, victim/complainant (e.g., age, race, sex, height, weight), and also provide a narrative of the event. In January 1991, the Charleston Police Department revised their report forms to conform with the Uniform Crime Reporting system (UCR). Although the newer reports are similar to the older ones, there are some obvious differences. For example, there is now a space allotted for the officers to check a box if the subject was under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Appendix A). On the earlier report forms, the sobriety of the subjects could only be established if the officer

⁴ Buzawa and Buzawa (1990) advise that even in the Minneapolis Police Department in 1986, there were only 3,645 arrests out of 29,948 domestic assault calls (i.e., arrests were made 20% of the time). Officers also commonly failed to write reports in spite of the mandatory arrest policy.

decided to mention it in his or her narrative (Appendix A).⁵

Criminal histories of subjects arrested for domestic assault were collected for the population of norm resisters and for the sample of nonresisters. This information was acquired from the I.D. Section of the department. Individual characteristics of the officers in the sampled encounters were obtained from Police Personnel and provided the reporting officer's name, rank, race, sex, date of birth and date of hire.⁶

Independent Variables

The independent variables in the hypotheses were analyzed to determine if they relate to norm resistance. The variables examined were batterers' prior arrests for any crime (PREARRST), arrests for only crimes of violence or disorder (PREVIOL), the intoxication of subjects (SUSINTOX), subjects' age (SUSAGE), subjects' race (SUSRACE), subjects'

⁵ The narrative allows reporting officers to describe the event or offense in their own words. The length of these narratives varies from a couple of sentences to several pages. Police supervisors, prosecutors and defense attorneys may read the officer's narrative. In a study on the use of force in Rochester, NY, Croft (1985, p. 53) explained, "The narrative . . . is based on the officer's perception of the situation and, therefore, is subject to the several inaccuracies common to a participant's perception and to recording past recollection."

⁶ The list was dated September, 1991. In a few cases, the reporting officer's name and characteristics were not found on the list. This meant that they were no longer working for the department. This was coded as missing data.

gender (SUSGEN), officers' age (OFFAGE), officers' race (OFFRACE), officers' gender (OFFGEN), officers' police experience (EXP), if the domestic was still in progress (INPROG), the kinship relationship of the disputants (REL), victims' employment status (EMP), victims' injuries (VVISINJ), witnesses present (WITNESS), number of disputants arrested (NUMARR), seriousness of the assault (FELONY), location of the dispute (LOC) and how the call was received (DIS).

The operationalization of these variables requires further attention. PREARRST refers to whether the subject does or does not have an arrest history prior to the incident report. Any prior misdemeanor or felony (both property and violent crimes) available to the Identification Section of the Charleston Police Department is included in this dichotomous variable.

PREVIOL refers to whether or not the subject has been arrested for any public order or personal crimes. This includes homicide, robbery, assault, domestic violence, resisting arrest, interfering with police, refusing to obey and disorderly conduct. In the City of Charleston, a person is charged with disorderly conduct if he or she causes a danger or a breach of the peace, makes offensive, disgusting or insulting remarks, or molests and interferes with any person lawfully in any public area (adapted from the Charleston City Code, Sec. 21-191). This information was

obtained from the Identification Section and is coded as either present or absent.

The variable SUSINTOX refers to whether or not the reporting officer noted that the subject had been drinking prior to the assault. This was either indicated by a box which could be checked (1991 reports) or by the officer's narrative (1988-1990 reports). The information is coded as either present or absent.

Officers (OFFAGE) who were 29 years old or less were considered "younger"; those 30 or older were coded as "older."⁷ The same coding convention was used to dichotomize the ages of the subjects (SUSAGE).

OFFEXP was based on the number of months the reporting officer had worked for the Charleston Police Department. If the officer had prior policing experience at another agency, it was not included in this study. Officers with more than 48 months of experience with the Charleston Police Department were considered more experienced; all others were less experienced.

DIS refers to how the officers received the dispute call. The coding reflected whether the encounter resulted from the police radio dispatcher or was on sight or on view. If the disputants were still involved in an altercation when officers arrived, the dispute was coded as in progress

⁷ In a study of police use of force in Rochester, NY, Croft (1985) used the age of 30 to divide older and younger officers.

(INPROG). This information was taken from the officer's report narrative.

REL refers to the relationship between the subject and the victim. Information was coded as related or married (husband-wife; brother-sister, father-son) or acquaintances (boyfriend-girlfriend, neighbors).⁸

The variable EMP refers to whether the victim was employed at the time of the dispute. The information was taken from the business phone and the employer/occupation box listed for the victim on the report. This was coded either employed outside the home or not so employed.

The variable VVISINJ refers to whether the officers observed any visible injuries to the victims. This was obtained from the narrative of the incident report and coded as either present or absent.

The variable FELONY refers to whether the initial domestic assault was a misdemeanor or a felony. Aggravated assaults, i.e., assaults involving the use of deadly weapons, are felonies; however, minor or simple assaults, i.e., involving hands, are usually misdemeanors.

Both the variables WITNESS and LOC refer to the visibility of the police-citizen encounter. The first addresses individuals actually present (other than disputants); the second deals with the potential visibility

⁸ Acquaintances were rarely living in the same household and had different addresses on the police incident report.

of the encounter (Friedrich, 1980). Witness was coded as present or absent; location was coded as in a dwelling or outside a dwelling in a public area.

Several hypotheses refer to differences between subjects and authorities (see Hypotheses 3-5). AGEDIFF was computed by subtracting SUSAGE (suspect's age) from OFFAGE (officer's age). For GENDIFF, the suspect's gender (SUSGEN) was subtracted from the officer's gender (OFFGEN). RACEDIFF was constructed by taking the difference between suspect's race (SUSRACE) and officer's race (OFFRACE). The resulting difference measures in each case were coded same or different for analysis.

Data Analysis

Descriptive, bivariate and multivariate analyses were used to present the data. Crosstabular analyses and Chi-square tests assessed whether norm resistance related to each independent variable. For example, do racial differences between police and batterers affect the likelihood of norm resistance occurring? Are subjects who have been arrested previously more likely to offer resistance? The main assumptions of the chi-square test permit it to be used with nominal-level variables. Random sampling (or a stratified random sample) is recommended; there should also be at least five cases in each cell of the cross-tabulation (Agresti & Finlay, 1986). While the

significance level commonly used in social sciences is $p < .05$, Blalock (1979, p. 161) advises, "there is nothing sacred or absolute about these levels . . . [I]f one actually did not want to reject the null hypotheses, he or she would be on safer ground using the .10, .20 or even .30 level, thereby reducing the risk of a type II error."⁹ Since this study is exploratory, the significance level is set at .10.¹⁰

T-tests were also used to examine the differences in the means of the norm resister group and the nonresisters on several interval level variables, e.g., officer age, officer experience and subject age (see Appendix B). The main assumptions of a t-test are that the population distribution is normal, the variables can be measured on an interval scale and the sample was randomly selected (Norusis, 1988). According to Agresti and Finlay (1986, p. 141), "The t-test for a mean is quite robust against violations of the assumption that the population distribution is normal."

The number of indicators present in each of the three constructs (basic conflict, sophistication, organization) were added into separate indexes. More indicators of cultural differences, organization, and a lack of

⁹ Norusis refers to a Type II error as "not finding a difference when there is one" (1988, p. 209).

¹⁰ In their exploratory study of police executive stress, Crank et al. (1992) used a .10 significance level order to avoid making a Type II error.

sophistication were hypothesized to relate to norm resistance at the domestic dispute. Each indicator was coded as either + 1 or 0 (present or absent). There were five indicators of basic conflict (CONFLICT) so the conflict index ranged from 0 to 5 (see Hypotheses 1-5). The indicators are: differences in the race of authorities and subjects (RACEDIFF); differences in ages of authorities and subjects (AGEDIFF); differences in the gender of authorities and subjects (GENDIFF); previous arrests of batterers (PREARRST); and batterers' previous arrests for crimes of violence or disorder (PREVIOL).

There were five indicators of the sophistication construct (SOPH) and its index also ranged from 0 to 5. The indicators of lack of sophistication are: suspect intoxication (SUSINTOX); whether the dispute was in progress when police arrived (INPROG); how the dispute came to the attention of the police because it was on-view (DIS); less experience of the officers (OFFEXP); and younger age of the officers (OFFAGE).

A similar organization index was constructed from six organization indicators. The range of the organization of subjects (ORGAN) was from 0 to 6. Indicators of more organization are: no visible injuries to victims (VVISINJ); the disputants were related or married (REL); the presence of witnesses (WITNESS); more than one disputant was arrested

(NUMARR); a public location of the dispute (LOC); and the charge was or would be only a misdemeanor (FELONY).

These indices were used in several different analyses. First each one of them was crosstabulated with norm resistance. Second, they were simultaneously entered into a discriminant function analysis to see how well they could discriminate norm resistance cases from nonresistance cases.

According to Klecka (1980), discriminant function analysis has seven assumptions: (1) two or more groups are required, (2) there are at least two cases in each group, (3) any number of discriminating variables can exist provided it is less than the total number of cases minus two, (4) the discriminating variables are at the interval level, (5) no discriminating variable is a linear combination of other discriminating variables, (6) the covariance matrices for each group is approximately equal and (7) each group was drawn from a population with a multivariate normal distribution on the discriminating variables.

The first three assumptions are obviously satisfied with these data. Assumption 4 is also met in that the indices are counts of how many indicators are present. The zero order correlations show that the three indices were not linear combinations of each other. The correlations were $-.03712$ between sophistication and organization, $-.03308$ between organization and culture conflict, and $.04378$

between culture conflict and sophistication; assumption 5 is satisfied. The covariance matrices for the indices are not significantly different according to Box's M (Box's M = 8.2586, $p = .23$). Thus assumption 6 is met. Klecka (1980, p. 62) maintains that "discriminant analysis can be performed when the assumptions of multivariate normal distributions and equal group covariance matrices are not satisfied." Violation of these assumptions may make it more difficult to determine how many functions help discriminate among groups (not applicable to our two group analysis). In addition, it may lead to some loss of ability in classification of cases; however, the technique is robust if the percentage of correct classifications is high. Thus, the technique is robust even if the multivariate normal distribution (Assumption 7) is not met.

Discriminant function analysis yields a variety of helpful summary statistics. It produces standardized discriminant function coefficients that indicate the relative magnitudes of the respective variables in discriminating between groups. Canonical correlations provide estimates of the overall predictive utility of the variables that are included in a discriminant function. The square of the canonical correlation can be interpreted as the amount of variation between the groups accounted for by the discriminant function. The technique also performs a

classification analysis to reveal how many cases are correctly classified by the discriminant function.

One way to establish the efficacy of discriminant function analysis is to conduct a proportional reduction in error (PRE) statistic for the classification. Klecka (1980, pp. 50-51) offers the formula for such a statistic, tau. Tau is used to see how much better than chance the Turk indices perform. If the reduction in error is substantial we know that any violation of assumptions did not change the analysis or findings.

A logistic regression model was used to regress the norm resistance (a binary dependent variable) on each of the respective indicators of culture conflict, sophistication, and organization. Logistic regression requires fewer assumptions than multivariate techniques built on least-squares, such as multiple regression or discriminant analysis (Norusis, 1988). Logistic regression analysis requires the number of cases be at least four times the number of independent variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1983). A parsimonious set of independent variables is preferred. Multicollinearity may be a problem in most regression analyses, as some independent variables are likely to be intercorrelated, (e.g., officer age and officer experience). However, Schroeder et al., (1986, p. 72) caution, "there is no single preferable technique for overcoming multicollinearity, since the problem is due to the form of the

data." A correlation matrix or phi associations are often used to search for multicollinearity between interval or nominal level variables (see Appendix B). The independent variables that were insignificant in the crosstabulations were excluded from the logistic regression analysis. Logit coefficients, standard errors, and p values are reported for the effects of each independent variable on norm resistance.

Savannah, GA

The Savannah data were collected to investigate hypothesis 20. The Savannah Police Department serves a community of 151,288 residents with blacks comprising 56% of the city population. The patrol area is almost 51 square miles and there are 328 sworn police officers and 89 civilian employees.¹¹ One very important reason for selecting the Savannah Police for this research is because it used a separate report code for domestic disputes before and after the proarrest policy began.¹² A one-group before-and-after design was used to examine the arrest policy and its impact on police-citizen conflict. This pre-experimental design is often called a one-group pretest-

¹¹ This information was obtained from a report submitted to Savannah Police Chief David Gellatly (Knoche, 1990).

¹² If the police department did not separately code domestics, the author would have had to read every general disturbance call (e.g., stranger assaults, bar fights, loud parties, disorderly persons) to filter out the domestic assault cases.

posttest design (Babbie, 1989). One inherent weakness of this design is that it fails to control for other factors (e.g., historical events) that may cause changes from the pretest to the posttest. However, after interviewing several members of the Savannah police, the researcher is unaware of any unusual circumstances that occurred in Savannah during this time period.

The independent variable is Savannah's presumptive arrest policy, which was implemented on May 27, 1987. It states:

Anytime any officers respond to a domestic disturbance where a criminal act has occurred, and there is sufficient probable cause to identify the perpetrator along with the substantiating of the charge, an arrest may be made by officers as defined by State Code. (Savannah Police Standard Operating Procedure 1-20-11)

A sample of 253 domestic violence reports from January 1987 through February 1988 was collected from the Savannah Police Records Unit. Officers in Savannah are requested to write reports on all domestic disputes to which they are dispatched. However, some of these calls were "unfounded" in the judgment of the responding officers.¹³ Therefore, only those reports where officers found evidence of a domestic assault were included in this study. In the five months prior to the implementation of the presumptive arrest

¹³ The researcher's prior experience as a police sergeant was very useful in making sure that unfounded reports did not satisfy the elements of a domestic assault crime. Unfounded reports generally involved calls where victims were not located.

policy (January 1, 1987 to May, 26, 1987), 326 reports were found dealing with domestic problems. A systematic sample of half those reports was drawn. Of these 163 reports, 57 dealt with child abuse, child neglect, or abandonment and were dropped. Another 10 reports were incomplete, leaving a sample of 96 valid domestic violence incident reports. Reports written prior to January 1, 1987 were not collected, since the police department no longer had these on their computer.¹⁴ During the first nine months after the policy (May 27, 1987 to February 28, 1988), 843 reports were available according to the computer lists. A one-in-four systematic sample was taken and after all of the reports dealing with child abuse, neglect and those that were incomplete were deleted, 157 incident reports remained that could be analyzed. With these samples, the impact of Savannah's proarrest policy was examined to see if there was any variation in the rate of police-citizen violence.

Of course, impacts can only be anticipated if the arrest policy was complied with by the patrol officers. Therefore, the arrest rate was also examined before and after the policy. If officers did in fact arrest more frequently after the policy began, the probability of

¹⁴ A computer list of the domestics was available for the current year (1992) and the previous five years (1987-1991). Therefore, only five months of reports during the pre-presumptive arrest period could be obtained.

conflict should increase, as the authorities' cultural norms and social norms become congruent.

Norm resistance was crosstabulated by the presence or absence of a proarrest policy. A chi-square test was used to assess the significance of differences in the number of cases of norm resistance and nonresistance before and after Savannah had implemented the proarrest policy.

CHAPTER 5 RESULTS

Charleston, SC

Descriptive Statistics

This section describes the variables relevant to Turk's conflict, sophistication, and organization themes. The frequencies and percentages for each variable are introduced below. Similar descriptive information from other studies is presented in footnotes to provide some points of comparison.

Turk's (1969) basic conflict assumption suggests that when great differences exist between the experiences of authorities and of subjects, conflict is more likely to become overt. Table 4 displays the descriptive information relevant to the basic conflict assumption and cultural norms of the subjects. Slightly more than half (56%) of the officers in the study were white and most of the officers were males (90.6%). While whites constituted 57.2% of the general population of Charleston, only 28.7% of the subjects (suspects) were white.¹ Most of the subjects (94.1%) in

¹ Due to the small number of Hispanics and Asians in the sample, blacks, Hispanics and Asians were combined into a non-white category. In a recent study of racial

the study were males.² Most of the officers were under 30 years of age (57%); however, only 40.1% of the subjects were under 30.³ In terms of prior arrests, 69.5% of the subjects had a criminal history, and 53.3% had a previous arrest for a crime of violence or disorder.⁴

Table 5 presents the distribution for sophistication variables at domestic disputes in Charleston. Recall that sophistication for Turk (1966, 1969) referred to the ability to manipulate others. In the sample, 65.8% of the officers were considered to be less experienced (≤ 48 months). Intoxication or alcohol use by subjects was reported by officers in 38.4% of the disputes. This is considerably lower than in other studies recently conducted in Ontario,

discrimination and capital sentencing in Texas (Ralph et al., 1992), blacks and Hispanics were combined into a non-Anglo-American group for this reason.

² From January to December 1990, Albuquerque, NM Police Department reports indicate that 81% of the domestic batterers were male (Carter, 1991).

³ This compares with the Albuquerque Police Department's reports from January through December 1990, which indicate that 45% of the batterers were between 21 and 30 years old (Carter, 1991).

⁴ In Minneapolis, Sherman and Berk (1984) found 59% of the batterers had a prior arrest for any offense and 36% for crimes against persons, (including domestic violence). Friday et al., (1991) found that 57.9% of male batterers in a Midwestern city had been previously arrested for domestic assault. Hirschel et al., (1992) discovered that 69.4% of male batterers had criminal histories in a study in Charlotte, NC.

Table 4: Frequency Distribution Related to Basic Culture Conflict and Cultural Norms of Subjects at Domestic Disputes Charleston, SC Police, 1988 to 1991

Independent Variables	Total Valid Cases	Cases in Which Value of Variables is "Yes"	
		<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
White officer	160	90	56.3%
White subject	167	48	28.7%
Male officer	160	145	90.6%
Male subject	169	159	94.1%
Officer less 30 years old	159	91	57.2%
Subject less 30 years old	167	67	40.1%
Subject prior arrest	167	116	69.5%
Subject prior arrest crime of violence/disorder	167	89	53.3%

Table 5: Frequency Distribution of Sophistication Indicators at Domestic Disputes, Charleston, SC Police, 1988 to 1991

Independent Variables	Total Valid Cases	Cases in Which Value of Variables is "Yes"	
		<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Officer experienced	158	54	34.2%
Officer under 30 years old	159	91	57.2%
Subject intoxicated	164	63	38.4%
Dispatched to call	163	153	93.9%
Dispute in progress	170	36	21.2%

Canada and Baltimore County, MD⁵ (Choi, 1989; Uchida & Brooks, 1988) and may be related to the report forms used by the Charleston Police from 1988 through 1990, which did not have a distinct box for the subjects' sobriety. In a study on the police use of force in Rochester, NY, Croft (1985) found that the sobriety of the suspect was often not indicated by officers on the reports. She cautioned that the "[S]tatistics represent the basic minimum identifiable involvement of opponents who had been drinking or using drugs" (Croft, 1985, p. 107). Where officers did indicate substance use by batterers, it can be surmised that these were the more conspicuous examples.

In almost all of the domestic disputes (93.9%) officers received the call through radio dispatch rather than on view. Disputants were still fighting when police arrived (in-progress calls) 21.2% of the time.

Table 6 provides the frequencies of several organization variables. In 49.4% of the calls, the victims of the domestic assaults received visible injuries.⁶ The disputants were married or related to each other 75% of the

⁵ In a study of domestic disputes in Baltimore County, MD, 73% of the suspects were either intoxicated or had been drinking (Uchida and Brooks, 1988). In Ontario, Canada, Choi (1989) found that 79% of the suspects had been drinking.

⁶ Officers in Ontario, Canada reported injuries to the victims in 59% of the domestic disputes (Choi, 1989).

Table 6: Frequency Distribution of Organization Indicators at Domestic Disputes, Charleston, SC Police, 1988 to 1991

Independent Variables	Total Valid Cases	Cases in Which Value of Variables is "yes"	
		<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Victims injuries	170	84	49.4%
Married or relatives	170	128	75.2%
Victims employed	162	47	29.0%
Multiple arrests	170	10	5.9%
Witnesses present	169	39	22.9%
Dispute inside residence	170	135	79.4%
Felony charge	170	24	14.1%

time.⁷ In terms of the location, 79.4% of the disputes occurred indoors.⁸ Most of the assault victims were unemployed (71%).⁹ In the vast majority of calls, there were no witnesses present (77.1%). More than one person was seldom arrested at any domestic dispute (5.9%).¹⁰ Most of the domestic violence incidents were misdemeanors (85.9%) rather than felonies.

In sum, most of the domestic disputes studied involved married or related disputants. The subjects were black males, over 30 years of age with at least one prior arrest. The officers were white males, under 30 years old with less than four years of police experience on the department. The disputes occurred indoors, without witnesses, and were over when the responding officers entered the picture. Most of the disputes were classified as misdemeanors, without visible injuries to the victims.

⁷ According to Berk and Loseke's (1980) research in Santa Barbara, CA, the disputants were married in 48% of the cases of domestic violence.

⁸ In Baltimore County, MD, 81% of the domestic disturbances occurred inside a residential dwelling (Uchida & Brooks, 1988).

⁹ In Minneapolis, Sherman and Berk (1984) found that 61% of domestic violence victims were unemployed, and in central Florida, Johnson (1990) found that 60% of the battered women were unemployed.

¹⁰ In the State of Washington, one-third of the domestic violence arrests involved more than one suspect. In Connecticut and Oregon, 18.8% and 11% of the arrests made at domestics were dual arrests respectively (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1990).

Crosstabulations

Crosstabular analyses were conducted between norm resistance and the independent variables related to culture conflict, sophistication, and organization. They are used to examine the first 17 hypotheses. According to Choi (1989, p. 80), "Crosstabular analyses are relatively easy to understand and serve as a basic screening of relationships between variables." Multivariate analyses, which are capable of applying numerous independent variables at one time, are shown later.

Basic Culture Conflict

Turk sees conflict as inherent in authority-subject relations. The first hypothesis reflects the argument that conflict is more likely to become overt when subjects have a history of opposition. Prior criminal record shows a tendency to behave in ways that challenged the normative order previously.

Table 7 shows that subjects with a criminal record were more likely to be involved in norm resistance than those without a record (56.0% versus 41.2%). The difference did not quite reach statistical significance ($X^2 = 2.56$, $p = .109$) but was in the predicted direction of hypothesis 1.

Table 8 indicates that subjects with a prior arrest for a crime of violence or disorder were more likely to be involved in overt conflict with authorities. While 59.6% of

the subjects with an arrest for violent charges were norm resisters, only 42.3% of the subjects who were never arrested for a crime of violence or disorder were resisters ($X^2 = 4.28$, $p = .038$). There is evidence that previous violence/disorder by subjects (batterers) at domestics results in a greater likelihood of overt conflict with authorities, i.e., the police. Hypothesis 2 is supported.

Table 7: Arrest History of Subjects By Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Prior Arrest	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Yes*	56.0% (65)	44.0% (51)	100% (116)
No	41.2% (21)	58.8% (30)	100% (51)
All Subjects	51.5% (86)	48.5% (81)	100% (167)

Chi-square = 2.56, 1 d.f., $p = .109$

* More resistance predicted

Table 8: Arrest History of Subjects for a Crime of Violence or Disorder By Norm Resistance Charleston, South Carolina Police Department, 1988-1991

Prior Arrest	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Yes *	59.6% (53)	40.4% (36)	100% (89)
No	42.3% (33)	57.7% (45)	100% (78)
All Subjects	51.5% (86)	48.5% (81)	100% (167)

Chi-square = 4.28, 1 d.f., $p = .038$

* More resistance predicted

Differences in race, sex and age are likely to result in a greater potential for overt conflict when authorities and subjects clash. According to Turk, when differences exist "between the experiences of subjects and of authorities. . . [such] that they are no longer able to mesh their behavior and to communicate adequately, the authorities are likely to initiate too much or too little coercion" (1969, p. 44). The indicators of culture conflict available in this dissertation include differences in officer and subject ages, their respective races, and their genders--the subjects of hypotheses 3, 4, and 5.

Age differences of authorities and subjects were found to affect the chance of overt conflict at domestics. Table 9a crosstabulates norm resistance by differences in age. When officers' and suspects' ages contrast, norm resistance was detected in 58.7% of the cases. However, when authorities and subjects were from the same age group, norm resistance occurred in 42.0% of the calls ($X^2 = 3.69$, $p = .054$).

According to Sykes and Clark (1980, p. 96), "[A]n adult officer is expected to treat a senior citizen with due respect for the citizen's age. The aged may also be correspondingly less deferent toward the officer." While officers expect to be deferred to by citizens, older subjects may anticipate "special deference" based on their status alone, even when they are the law violators.

Table 9a: Differences in Age of Officers and Subjects By
Norm Resistance Charleston, SC Police Department,
1988-1991

Officer/Subject Age	Norm Resistance		Row Totals	
	Yes	No		
Same	42.0% (34)	58.0% (47)	100%	(81)
Different *	58.7% (44)	41.3% (31)	100%	(75)
All Encounters	50.0% (78)	50.0% (78)	100%	(156)

Chi-square = 3.69, 1 d.f., $p = .054$

* More resistance predicted

Table 9b provides an elaboration on age differences of officers and subjects. Conflict was most likely to transpire when younger officers and older subjects confronted one another; norm resistance occurred in 60.8% of these encounters. The next most likely interaction resulting in conflict involved encounters between older officers and younger subjects (54.2%). Where officers and subjects were both younger, conflict occurred in 48.7% of the calls. When officers and subjects were both older, only 35.7% of the domestics involved norm resistance ($X^2 = 5.99$, $p = .11$).

The results suggest that patterns of deference may be interacting with the potential for conflict. Where officers and suspects are both older, there is mutual deference (and lower overt conflict). Where authorities are younger and subjects older, there is a clash of deference norms--the

Table 9b: Officer-Subject Age by Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Officer-Subject Age	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Younger Officers Younger Subjects	48.7% (19)	51.3% (20)	100% (39)
Older Officers Younger Subjects	54.2% (13)	45.8% (11)	100% (24)
Younger Officers * Older Subjects	60.8% (31)	39.2% (20)	100% (51)
Older Officers Older Subjects	35.7% (15)	64.3% (27)	100% (42)
	50.0% (78)	50.0% (78)	100% (156)

Chi-square = 5.99, 3 d.f., $p = .111$

* More resistance predicted

young are supposed to defer to the old but the subject is supposed to defer to the authority. A separate crosstabulation comparing norm resistance for circumstances involving younger officers and older subjects (less deference) with norm resistance for encounters involving older officers and older subjects (mutual deference) showed a significant contrast ($X = 4.83$; $p = .027$).

There is support for the third hypothesis of this dissertation, which relates age differences with the occurrence of norm resistance. The relationship is especially pronounced when patterns of deference are considered in addition to culture conflict. Perhaps

hypothesis 3 should be restated: Overt conflict between authorities and subjects will be more likely when subjects are over 30 years of age and officers are under 30 years of age and overt conflict will be less likely when authorities and subjects are both over 30 years of age. Age-related norms of deference may either reinforce or diminish the deference suspects extend to officers.

The fourth hypothesis addresses racial differences between officers and subjects. The basic crosstabulation is presented in Table 10a. No significant relationship was found between racial differences and norm resistance ($X^2 = .308$, $p = .578$).

Further analysis was performed to see whether there was a direct race effect (rather than one due to race differences between officers and subjects) as some have suggested (see Fyfe, 1982; Geller & Karales, 1981 for race-of-officer effect). White officers were less likely to meet norm resistance than were their nonwhite counterparts (44.9% to 57.4%), but the percentage difference did not quite reach statistical significance ($p = .14$). Perhaps there are race-related norms of deference so that white officers are treated differently from their nonwhite counterparts.

In American culture, especially in the South, the patterns of deference may be such that people are taught to defer to whites rather than to nonwhites. Subjects, especially white subjects, may not have learned strong norms

Table 10a: Differences in Race of Officers and Subjects By
Norm Resistance Charleston, SC Police
Department, 1988-1991

Officer/Subject Race	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Same	53.0% (44)	47.0% (39)	100% (83)
Different *	47.3% (35)	52.7% (39)	100% (74)
All Encounters	50.3% (79)	49.7% (78)	100% (157)

Chi-square = .308, 1 d.f., $p = .578$

* More resistance predicted

of deference to nonwhite authorities. The crosstabulation of race was elaborated and the results are presented in Table 10b. Table 10b indicates that when nonwhite officers responded to domestics involving white subjects, norm resistance resulted 61.5% of the time. When officers were white and subjects were nonwhite, norm resistance occurred in just 44.2% of the calls, however. Although the percentage difference for this contrast is marked (17.3%), it was not statistically significant ($p = .408$) when these two categories were isolated in a separate crosstabulation. There were just too few cases in the "nonwhite officer/white subject" category ($n = 13$) relative to the "white officer/nonwhite subject" one ($n = 61$) to establish the difference with statistical confidence.

Table 10b: Officer-Subject Race By Norm Resistance
 Charleston, SC Police Department,
 1988-1991

Officer-Subject Race	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
White Officers Nonwhite Subjects	44.2% (27)	55.8% (34)	100% (61)
White Officers White Subjects	46.4% (13)	53.6% (15)	100% (28)
Nonwhite Officers Nonwhite Subjects	56.3% (31)	43.7% (24)	100% (55)
Nonwhite Officers * White Subjects	61.5% (8)	38.5% (5)	100% (13)
All Encounters	50.3% (79)	49.7% (78)	100% (157)

Chi-square = 2.52, 3 d.f., p = .471

* More conflict predicted

Nevertheless, the results are suggestive. White subjects may be less willing to grant deference to nonwhite authorities, perhaps believing they are superordinate to these officers (see Sykes & Clark, 1980). The norms of deference are learned by "direct and unsuccessful conflicts with authorities or through gradual socialization into the authority structure" (Turk, 1966, p. 345). Subjects may be cautious about opposing white authorities in Charleston, since opposing white officers violates norms of deference

about race and position, and as such constitute an "unrealistic move" (see Turk, 1966).¹¹

The findings about race were in the direction suggested by Turk. However, the fourth hypothesis probably needs to be restated because of race-related norms of deference: Overt conflict will be more likely when officers are nonwhite and subjects are white and least likely when officers are white and subjects are nonwhite. Nonwhite subjects have learned to defer to both authorities and whites. From Turk's perspective, if other things are equal, nonwhites are less likely to resist white officers. Nonwhites may be in potential conflict with authorities more often than whites because of cultural differences. Thus nonwhites may be more disrespectful or hold hostile attitudes toward authorities. But their behavior is also checked by racial deference patterns. These findings suggest that nonwhite subjects may be more likely to resist nonwhite officers than white officers. Perhaps this helps explain why much police use of force on blacks is by black officers (Fyfe, 1981; Geller & Karales, 1981). To the extent that nonwhite officers are also not as readily deferred to by white citizens, nonwhite officers face double jeopardy.

¹¹ Unrealistic moves are those that reduce the chance of success for the law-enforcing or law-resistant and result in overt conflict (Turk, 1966).

Table 11a: Differences in Gender of Officer and Subjects By
Norm Resistance Charleston, SC Police
Department, 1988-1991

Officer/Subject Sex	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Same	52.1% (73)	47.9% (67)	100% (140)
Different *	45.0% (9)	55.0% (11)	100% (20)
All Encounters	51.3% (82)	48.8% (78)	100% (160)

Chi-square = .128, 1 d.f., $p = .719$

* More resistance predicted

The fifth hypothesis directs attention to gender differences between officers and subjects. The crosstabulation is presented in Table 11a. No significant relationship exists ($X^2 = .128$, $p = .71$), although the total of female officers and subjects is very low.¹²

Again, it may be necessary to consider how patterns of deference may interact with culture conflict. Resistance should be greater when male subjects have to defer to female officers; it should be least where female subjects defer to male officers. The elaboration also does not yield any significant relationship; see Table 11b ($X^2 = 3.46$, $p = .325$). However, there are some marked percentage

¹² Although Blumberg (1983) found that female officers were less likely than their male counterparts to be involved in deadly force incidents in Kansas City, MO, he cautioned that any conclusions must be tentative because of their small numbers on the force.

differences (that do not rise to statistical significance because of the small numbers of female officers and subjects). Female subjects are most likely to defer to male officers; at least this circumstance produced the lowest resistance rate (37.5%). Half of the cases where a male subject was to defer to a female officer produced resistance. These findings are suggestive, but the number of cases is too small for confident conclusions.

Table 11b: Officer-Subject Gender By Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Officer-Subject Gender	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Male Officers Male Subjects	51.1% (70)	48.9% (67)	100% (137)
Male Officers Female Subjects	37.5% (3)	62.5% (5)	100% (8)
Female Officers * Male Subjects	50.0% (6)	50.0% (6)	100% (12)
Female Officers Female Subjects	100.0% (3)	0.0% (0)	100% (3)
	51.3% (82)	48.8% (78)	100% (160)

Chi-square = 3.46, 3 d.f., p = .325

* More resistance predicted

Sophistication Indicators

For Turk, conflict would be more likely to become overt when authorities and/or subjects were less sophisticated-- i.e., less able to manipulate the situation so that the clash may be avoided. The structural indicators of sophistication available in this research include: officer experience, officer age, subject intoxication, whether or not the dispute was still in progress, and how the dispute came to the attention of the police.

Hypothesis 6 addresses the sophistication that comes from experience. Officers who are more experienced should encounter less conflict.¹³ Table 12 indicates that norm resistance did not vary significantly with police experience, although less experienced officers were more likely to report conflict: 53.8% compared to 46.3% for the more experienced group ($X^2 = .536$, $p = .463$). This was in the direction predicted in hypothesis 7. The result of a t-test indicates no difference in the mean level of police experience between the norm resister group and the control group. The mean amount of experience for officers in the norm resister group is 50.75 months, while it is 50.80 for nonresisters ($t = .01$, $p = .995$, see Appendix B).

¹³ In a recent survey conducted in west central Florida, more experienced officers were more likely to believe that proarrest redirected hostility toward the police (Blount et al., 1992).

While the relationship between officer age (authority sophistication) and norm resistance was not statistically significant ($X^2 = 1.76$, $p = .184$), younger officers (between 20 and 29 years old) had a greater probability of being involved in norm resistance at domestic disputes (see Table 13). For example, 56% of the younger officers reported overt conflict compared to 44% of the older officers.¹⁴ Officers involved in norm resistance calls were on the average one year younger than officers in the nonresister group. The mean age of officers in the norm resister group was 29.24 years compared to 30.42 years for the nonresisters

Table 12: Officer Experience By Norm Resistance Charleston, SC Police, 1988-1991

Was the Officer Experienced?	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Yes	46.3% (25)	53.7% (29)	100% (54)
No*	53.8% (56)	46.2% (48)	100% (104)
All Officers	51.3% (81)	48.7% (77)	100% (158)

Chi-square = .536, 1 d.f., $p = .463$

* Less sophisticated authorities so more resistance predicted

¹⁴ Area (Team) and shift were used as control variables, since past research has shown that younger officers who are lacking in seniority are more likely to be assigned to less desirable shifts in higher crime areas (see Blumberg, 1983; Swanton, 1985). However, no relationship was found between officers' age and norm resistance, even after controlling for shift or area in Charleston.

Table 13: Officer Age By Norm Resistance Charleston, SC
Police, 1988-1991

Officer Age	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
20-29*	56.0% (51)	44.0% (40)	100% (91)
30-55	44.1% (30)	55.9% (38)	100% (68)
All Officers	50.9% (81)	49.1% (78)	100% (159)

Chi-square = 1.76, 1 d.f., $p = .184$

* Less sophisticated authorities so more resistance predicted

($t = 1.23$, $p = .219$, see Appendix B).¹⁵ Therefore, the results of the bivariate analysis relating the officers' ages with norm resistance was in the predicted direction of hypothesis 7.

It was hypothesized that norm resistance is more likely to occur when the subjects are intoxicated, i.e., drinking or drug-using. While 68.3% of the intoxicated subjects were

¹⁵ The relationship between subject age and norm resistance was also examined; however, it was not significant ($X^2 = .00$, $p = 1.0$). The mean age of the subjects in the norm resistance group was 33.52 years and 33.51 years in the nonresister group ($t = .00$, $p = .998$). Previous studies by Friedrich (1980), Sherman & Langworthy (1979) and Taylor-Greene (1988), all discovered subject age was unrelated to police-citizen violence. However, Croft (1985), Blumberg (1983) and Uchida & Brooks (1988) found it was significant. None of these studies focused exclusively on domestic disputes though. For example, Croft (1985) examined police use of force; Blumberg (1983), Taylor-Greene (1988) and Sherman & Langworthy (1979) looked at police use of deadly force; Uchida & Brooks (1988) focused on violence toward police.

norm resisters, 40.6% of the non-intoxicated subjects were not ($X^2 = 10.79$, $p = .001$). Hypothesis 8 is thus supported (see Table 14).

Turk (1969, p. 59) might argue that intoxicated batterers are less sophisticated and less capable of "assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their position relative to the authorities." A police incident report shows how alcohol appears to have affected one batterer in a domestic argument in Charleston.

Table 14: Intoxication of Subjects By Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Intoxicated Subjects	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Yes*	68.3% (43)	31.7% (20)	100% (63)
No	40.6% (41)	59.4% (60)	100% (101)
All Subjects	51.2% (84)	48.8% (80)	100% (164)

Chi-square = 10.79, 1 d.f., $p = .001$

* Less sophisticated subjects so more resistance predicted

That on [the above date and time] R\O and Officer B. responded to a domestic dispute. Upon arrival R\O observed broken windows and glass on the front porch. The complainant, Mrs. S. stated when her son came home, he was intoxicated and became loud and boisterous and otherwise obnoxious yelling at complainant and intimidating and scaring her out of her residence. R\O could hear subject screaming profanities (sic) from upstairs. The subject then proceeded to the outside porch. He then threw a sink faucet and flower pots and several bottles at officer M and Sgt. K as they

approached the house. At this time the subject was barricaded on the second floor of residence. As he became further disorderly, by throwing bottles, sink faucet and flower pots and yelling profanities (sic) at Officers B. and M., Officer L. kicked in the upstairs door while Officer M. kept suspect distracted. The subject was subdued and handcuffed. He was then placed into Officer L.'s patrol car where the subject then attempted to kick out the rear glass window. The subject was shackled and transported to CPD. While at CPD, the subject was uncooperative and placed into the drunk tank.

A significant difference was also found between domestics which were in-progress and those that were not (see Table 15). When the dispute was still in progress as officers arrived, norm resistance occurred 83.3% of the time. However, if the dispute had already ended, 44% of the calls resulted in conflict ($X^2 = 16.03$, $p = .0001$). As discovered by Bayley and Garofalo, when conflict is active, "[c]itizens' tempers are flaring, and the participants in the conflict are often not receptive to calm reasoning" (1989, p. 9). In this situation, both police and subjects may not have enough time to develop plans or tactics to avert open conflict. Hypothesis 9, relating norm resistance with in-progress disputes, is supported.

The following police report depicts a situation involving a subject who was assaulting his girlfriend when officers arrived at the dwelling.

Officer was dispatched to [the above location] in reference to a disturbance. Upon [officers'] arrival, R\O heard a females voice that appeared to be screaming. R\O knocked on the door of the above apt., and stated, "This is the Charleston City Police, open the door." R\O made

the above statement approximately 6 times, and the female's screaming became louder. Therefore R\O searched the apt. for another entrance, and made the above statement again, and also stated that, "if you don't open the door now, I will be forced to make a forcible entrance." The parties on the inside still refused to open the door, (But the screaming continued). Therefore, R\O kicked the front door open, and noticed that arrestee #1 was on top of arrestee #2 slapping her with open hands on the face refusing to let her up. R\O along with Officer S., Officer H. and Officer R. forced the above arrestee # 1 off arrestee # 2, and began to put the handcuffs on him (arrestee # 1), when arrestee # 2 came up from behind the officers and attempted to hit arrestee # 1 upon the upper part of his body with a bottle (liquor bottle). Officer H. grabbed arrestee # 2, and took the bottle from her. She was still attempting to make physical contact with arrestee #1. Therefore, both arrestee # 1 and 2 were charged [with] domestic violence.

Table 15: In Progress Assault By Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

In Progress	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Yes*	83.3% (30)	16.7% (6)	100% (36)
No	44.0% (59)	56.0% (75)	100% (134)
All Calls	52.4% (89)	47.6% (81)	100% (170)

Chi-square = 16.03, 1 d.f., p = .0001

* Less sophisticated authorities and subjects so more resistance predicted

Hypothesis 10, relating on-view calls with norm resistance, is not supported (see Table 16). The data indicate overt conflict did not vary by how the domestic dispute came to the attention of the police. Fifty percent of the on-view calls resulted in overt conflict compared to

Table 16: How Dispute Came to Attention of Police By Norm Resistance Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

How Call Received?	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
On View*	50.0% (5)	50.0% (5)	100% (10)
Dispatch	53.6% (82)	46.4% (71)	100% (153)
All Calls	53.4% (87)	46.6% (76)	100% (163)

Chi-square = .00, 1 d.f., $p = 1.0$

* Less sophisticated authorities so more resistance predicted

53.6% of the dispatched calls ($X^2 = .00$, $p = 1.0$). Because of the small number of cases which were considered to be on-view ($n = 10$), these findings are unstable.¹⁶

The following illustrates a domestic dispute that was observed by an officer while on routine patrol.

At approximately 2200, R/O was on routine patrol in the area of the Sailfish Lounge, when I observed the above subject, Mr. A. yelling at his wife, victim Mrs. A. The subject then grabbed the victim and began banging her head & back into the brick wall of the Sailfish. R/O then approached and ordered the subject to let go of the victim. The subject then let go and began yelling at officer. Subject was intoxicated during this time. He then began threatening to kick someone's

¹⁶ In a their study of Baltimore County police officers, Uchida and Brooks discovered that assaults on officers during domestic disputes were almost always citizen-initiated (or dispatched). "Since most domestic disturbances occur indoors and in residences, police are unlikely to view these situations on their own..." (Uchida & Brooks, 1988, p. 69).

ass who called the police and squared off as if to hit the victim or some other citizens who had exited the bar during the incident. R/O then grabbed the subject and told him he was under arrest. The subject then tried to break out of the hold and had to be forcibly pinned against the wall. Subject then threatened R/O.

Organization Indicators

Structural indicators of organization that are available for this research include: the relationship of the disputants, the employment status of the victims, the victims' visible injuries, the number of disputants arrested, presence of witnesses, location of the dispute, and the seriousness of the charges. As previously argued, there is a different level of complexity when officers challenge the authority of a head-of-household who has engaged in violence against his family members than when the officers intervene in a dispute between acquaintances. That is the subject of the eleventh hypothesis.

As reflected in Table 17, calls involving disputants who were married or related were more likely to result in norm resistance (56.3%) than disputes involving mere acquaintances (40.5%). The results approached significance ($X^2 = 2.55$, $p = .11$), and they were in the predicted direction of hypothesis 11. There may be some "noise" in the operationalization of this variable. For example, at some domestic disputes involving parents and their children (e.g., mother-daughter or father-son), it is unlikely that

Table 17: Relationship of Disputants by Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Relationship	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Married/Related*	56.3% (72)	43.8% (56)	100% (128)
Acquaintances	40.5% (17)	59.5% (25)	100% (42)
All Disputants	52.4% (89)	47.6% (81)	100% (170)

Chi-square = 2.55, 1 d.f., p = .11

* More organized subjects so more resistance predicted

the subject (batterer) was always the "head of the household," so the relationship may not have achieved significance because of the slippage in measurement.

An example of a dispute which involves a subject who advises the police he has the "right" to beat his wife if he wishes follows.

On [the above date], R/O observed the above named comp/victim, Mrs. J. fleeing south on King Street from Grove on foot and the suspect, Mr. J. pursuing after her/victim. At which time the suspect struck victim, knocking her to the ground and then struck her again. At this time R/O was close enough to the victim to physically pull her away from the suspect to prevent him/suspect from striking her again. At which time the suspect became very loud and belligerent and demanded R/O to get out of the way and stated that he would beat his wife if he wanted to. At this time Cpl. D. arrived on the scene and attempted to calm the suspect down but he refuse[d] causing a very large crowd to gather in the area to observe. The suspect then grabbed the victim again pushing her on a vehicle and CPD officers physically pulled him off and advised him/suspect that he was under arrest, at which time he/suspect pushed R/O away from him into the side of a vehicle. The suspect

stated that he was not going to jail causing R/O to request another unit to assist because the suspect continued to resist by pulling away and pushing R/O while Cpl. D. was trying to hold him from behind. The suspect was finally placed under arrest and transported to CPD where he was officially charged with the following: Disorderly Conduct (21-109); Assaulting Police Officer (21-191); Resisting Arrest (21-191), Domestic Violence (16-25-20).

The twelfth hypothesis focuses on the victims' employment. The concern is that economically dependent victims are forced to provide backing (organization) for their abusers (e.g., subject empowerment through alliances with the victim). Table 18 reflects the relationship between the victims' employment status and norm resistance. When victims were unemployed, overt conflict occurred in 44.3% of the disputes; however, when victims were employed, conflict occurred in 66% of the calls ($X^2 = 5.39$, $p = .020$). Although a significant relationship was found between the variables, it was not in the predicted direction. The results force reconsideration of the logic used to derive hypothesis 12.

According to Ferraro (1988), domestic batterers tend to be highly traditional in their ideas about male and female roles and have a need to dominant their spouses and family members. The victims' economic independence may actually contribute to the rage of the batterers, who then transfer their hostility onto the responding authorities. It is likely that these subjects would find it more difficult to

Table 18: Employment Status of Victim by Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Victim Employed?	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Yes	66.0% (31)	34.0% (16)	100% (47)
No*	44.3% (51)	55.7% (64)	100% (115)
All Victims	50.6% (82)	49.4% (80)	100% (162)

Chi-square = 5.39, 1 d.f., $p = .020$

* More organized subjects so more resistance predicted

defer to authorities when challenged, especially in front of family members.

Visible injury alters the social meaning and complexity of the interaction. As shown in Table 19, the difference in the probability of norm resistance for disputes where the victims were visibly injured and those where they were not was statistically significant ($X^2 = 2.82$, $p = .09$).

Consistent with the findings of Choi (1989) police were more likely to encounter overt conflict when victims were not visibly injured (59.3%) than when they were (45.2%).¹⁷

Like being arrested for misdemeanors, an absence of injuries to the victims may symbolize to the subjects that the

¹⁷ Choi (1989) refers to his finding that victim and officer injuries were inversely related as "puzzling." He offers an explanation that offenders who inflict injuries on the victim are more likely to leave prior to police arrival. However, in the current study the same inverse relationship was discovered while we controlled for suspect presence, i.e., all of the domestics sampled involved suspects who remained at the scene.

Table 19: Visible Injuries To Victim By Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Visible Injuries?	Norm Resistance		Row Totals	
	Yes	No		
Yes	45.2% (38)	54.8% (46)	100%	(84)
No*	59.3% (51)	40.7% (35)	100%	(86)
All Victims	52.4% (89)	47.6% (81)	100%	(170)

Chi-square = 2.82, 1 d.f., $p = .092$

* More organized subjects so more resistance predicted

criminal law has been unjustly applied (Reiss, 1974).

Hypothesis 13, which relates the absence of visible injuries to the victim and norm resistance has support.

In the discussion of organization, Turk (1969, p. 58) stated, "[a]n individual who has group support for his behavior is going to be more stubborn in the face of efforts to make him change than is someone who has only himself as an ally." Therefore, we would anticipate that the complexity of the encounter would increase when police make two or more arrests at domestics.¹⁸

Table 20 shows the relationship between norm resistance and the number of disputants arrested. The data indicate

¹⁸ In order to eliminate calls where subjects had left prior to the arrival of officers (since conflict was unlikely to occur in that situation), only the domestics resulting in an arrest were sampled. However, in 5 cases, disputes where the subjects were present but were not arrested were inadvertently included.

that norm resistance is more likely when more than one person is arrested ($X^2 = 5.19$, $p = .074$). When multiple arrests took place, conflict was reported at 80% of the calls; however, when only one person was arrested, 51.6% of the disputes involved norm resistance. In the cases where officers decided not to arrest for domestic violence, norm resistance occurred 20% of the time.

Subjects are more organized and have greater social support when they are not the sole arrestee; there is "strength in numbers." According to Gamson et al. (1982, p. 22), "the solidarity of a group of potential challengers is a product of both their sense of collective identity and the strength of their interpersonal ties."¹⁹

The actual visibility of police-citizen encounters creates greater complexity (organization) for both authorities and subjects.²⁰ According to Muir (1980, p. 52), "When the citizenry's need for saving face is involved, the authoritative power of the policeman will tend to

¹⁹ The insights of Gamson et al. prompted further analysis. The relationship between norm resistance and multiple arrests was elaborated by controlling for whether disputants were related (another organization variable). The association between norm resistance and multiple arrests was significant for married and related disputants ($X^2 = 5.14$, $p = .076$) but not for acquaintances ($X^2 = .121$, $p = .727$). If nothing else, Turk's abstract constructs help identify variables that affect norm resistance, even if Turk did not specify the variables.

²⁰ When bystanders are involved (e.g., calling the police), the domestic becomes more complicated and can become a matter of public order (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1990).

Table 20: Number of Disputants Arrested By Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Number Arrested	Norm Resistance		Row Totals	
	Yes	No		
None	20.0% (1)	80.0% (4)	100%	(5)
One	51.6% (80)	48.4% (75)	100%	(155)
Multiple*	80.0% (8)	20.0% (2)	100%	(10)
All Subjects	52.4% (89)	47.6% (81)	100%	(170)

Chi-square = 5.19, 2 d.f., $p = .074$

* More organized subjects so more resistance predicted

attract violence" (Westley, 1970).²¹ Table 21a shows the crosstabulation of norm resistance and the presence of witnesses. The data show that overt conflict is more likely when witnesses or bystanders are at the scene (69.2% and 47.7% respectively). This difference is statistically significant ($X^2 = 4.75$, $p = .029$) and is compatible with the findings of Friedrich (1980) and Smith and Visser (1981). Thus, hypothesis 15 is supported in the bivariate analysis.

Friedrich (1980) raised concerns, however, about the causality of the witness-conflict relationship. "Does an audience promote the use of force or does the use of force

²¹ While the author was a "rookie" patrol officer in Albuquerque, NM, a more "seasoned" officer advised him to try to avoid arresting male drivers while their wives were watching, since this would increase the likelihood of resistance. Instead, it was prudent to handcuff male suspects at the rear of their vehicles.

Table 21a: Presence of Witnesses By Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Witnesses Present	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Yes *	69.2% (27)	30.8% (12)	100% (39)
No	47.7% (62)	52.3% (68)	100% (130)
All Domestics	52.7% (89)	47.3% (80)	100% (169)

Chi-square = 4.75, 1 d.f., $p = .029$

* More organized subjects so more resistance predicted

attract an audience?" (Friedrich, 1980, p. 91). Table 21b controlled for the dispute's location (inside or outside). While one cell was extremely small ($n = 1$), the findings show that the relationship between witnesses and norm resistance was significant only when the dispute occurred outdoors ($X^2 = 3.74$, $p = .053$). However, when the dispute was inside, the relationship was no longer significant ($X^2 = 1.48$, $p = .22$), although it was in the predicted direction of hypothesis 15. Since the relationship between witnesses and norm resistance occurred only outdoors, Friedrich's (1980) concern about whether or not disturbances draw crowds is warranted.

The potential visibility of the encounters measured by the setting may also effect the probability of norm resistance. Officers are sensitive to the locale of interactions with the public and are normally attentive to

Table 21b: Presence of Witnesses By Norm Resistance By
Location Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-
1991

Witnesses	(INDOORS) Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Yes	63.3% (19)	36.7% (11)	100% (30)
No	48.6% (51)	51.4% (54)	100% (105)
	51.9% (70)	48.1% (65)	100% (135)

Chi-square = 1.48, 1 d.f., p = .222

Witnesses	(OUTDOORS) Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Yes	88.9% (8)	11.1% (1)	100% (9)
No	44.0% (11)	56.0% (14)	100% (25)
	55.9% (19)	44.1% (15)	100% (34)

Chi-square = 3.74, 1 d.f., p = .053

who may be watching (Lundman, 1980). Any signs in public that subjects are unwilling to defer to authority is often met with force (Manning, 1980; Westley, 1970). Conspicuous law violators are likely to be treated more harshly than those who break the law in private. According to Liska (1981), flagrant abuses of the law (e.g., prostitutes propositioning customers on the doorsteps of city hall) increases the probability of an official reaction. When

police-citizen encounters occur in public, the natural complexity of the situation increases, as moves on either side can be loaded with symbolic meanings (e.g., saving face, setting examples).²² Westley (1970, p. 127) claimed, "The presence of an audience seems to be the ultimate incentive to the use of force." The result is a greater likelihood of norm resistance.

Table 22 provides the relationship between norm resistance and the location of the dispute. No significant difference was found between domestics occurring indoors and those occurring outdoors ($X^2 = .004$, $p = .946$).²³ Hypothesis 16 is not supported from the data.

Subjects who have social support for their behavior should be more organized (Turk, 1969). According to hypothesis 17, the conflict potential is greater when batterers are arrested for misdemeanors than for felonies. In such cases, subjects tend to perceive police as treating them unjustly, since neighbors who commit similar "minor" assaults may escape arrest or formal sanctions (Croft, 1985; Reiss, 1974). The results of the crosstabular analysis in

²² Strong actions against a suspect may set an example to bystanders so that future action may not be necessary. Wilson et al., (1990, p. 266) stated, "[A]n officer who is being watched by others might be more inclined to take stronger actions that could result in a violent response from a suspect."

²³ This finding is also consistent with Friedrich (1980), who analyzed Reiss's 1966 observational data and found potential visibility was insignificant as a predictor for the police use of force.

Table 23 shows no difference in norm resistance between domestics where subjects were arrested for misdemeanors or felonies ($X^2 = .00$, $p = 1.0$). Hypothesis 17, relating conflict with the seriousness of the charge, is not supported.

Table 22: Location of the Dispute By Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Location	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Indoors	51.9% (70)	48.1% (65)	100% (135)
Outdoors *	54.3% (19)	45.7% (16)	100% (35)
All Disputes	52.4% (89)	47.6% (81)	100% (170)

Chi-square = .004, 1 d.f., $p = .946$

* More organized subjects so more resistance predicted

Table 23: Seriousness of the Charge By Norm Resistance
Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Charge (Domestic)	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
Misdemeanor *	52.1 (76)	47.9% (70)	100% (146)
Felony	54.2 (13)	45.8% (11)	100% (24)
All Charges	52.4 (89)	47.6% (81)	100% (170)

Chi-Square = .000, 1 d.f., $p = 1.00$

* More organized subjects so more resistance predicted

Summary

In summarizing the findings related to culture conflict, prior arrest of the subject was found to increase the probability of norm resistance. The relationship became even more striking (and statistically significant) for crimes of violence or disorder. The first two hypotheses were supported and are consistent with Turk's account.

An age difference between officers and subjects was also statistically related to norm resistance (supporting hypothesis 3). Norm resistance was more likely when younger officers and older subjects were involved. Although the relationship of norm resistance and difference in race between subjects and authorities was not statistically significant, nonwhite officers tended to have a higher rate of overt conflict, especially when dealing with white subjects (consistent with hypothesis 4). While the gender difference relationship was insignificant (perhaps due to their small numbers), female officers were more likely to be involved in norm resistance. And female subjects most readily deferred to male officers. This was not consistent with the original expectations stated in hypothesis 5, but the original hypothesis may have been derived from Turk poorly.

The percentage differences suggest that although differences in gender, race, and age may contribute to conflict, there may be important patterns of deference that

interact with the conflict potential. There is less overt conflict when older officers are dealing with older suspects, when white officers are dealing with nonwhite subjects, and when male officers are dealing with female suspects. To the extent that hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 focused only on age, race and gender differences, they probably need to be restated to reflect how patterns of deference keep some conflict from becoming overt. Although some of the relationships did not reach statistical significance, the overall pattern was consistent with Turk's theoretical arguments about norms of deference.

The sophistication indicators that were significant were subject intoxication and in-progress incidents. Domestics involving intoxicated subjects and disputes where the combatants were still fighting when officers arrived were more likely to result in norm resistance. While younger and less experienced (and thereby less sophisticated) officers had higher rates of overt conflict than did their older and more experienced counterparts, the differences were not statistically significant. How the call came to the attention of the officers (dispatched or on-view) was unrelated to overt conflict. Overall, two of the sophistication indicators were significantly related to norm resistance, and two others were related in the direction hypothesized. Hypotheses 6, 7, 8, and 9 tended to be supported. Hypothesis 10, dealing with on-view or

dispatched calls, was the only sophistication proposition that received no support.

Organization indicators which were significantly related to norm resistance in the predicted direction include: visible injuries to the victim, the presence of witnesses at the call, and the number of persons arrested. When victims received no visible injuries and when more than one person was arrested, the disputes were more likely to result in police-citizen conflict, i.e., norm resistance. The number of witnesses present also related to overt conflict. This relationship was most apparent when the incident took place out in public rather than indoors (i.e., witnesses interacted with location), which raises a question of causal ordering. Do audiences promote norm resistance or does norm resistance attract audiences?

Norm resistance was also more likely at disputes involving married/related disputants as opposed to unrelated ones; however, the relationship did not achieve statistical significance. While the employment status of the victims was significantly related to overt citizen-police conflict, it was not in the predicted direction. Location of the disputes and seriousness of the charge were unrelated to norm resistance in bivariate analyses.

Overall, the organization indicators fared well. Three of them bore significant relationships to norm resistance in the expected direction; hypotheses 13 (visible injuries), 14

(multiple arrests), and 15 (presence of witnesses) receive support. One more indicator (relationship of disputants) showed a percentage difference consistent with hypothesis 11, although the relationship was not statistically significant. While hypothesis 16, concerning whether the dispute was indoors or out in public, was not supported by bivariate crosstabular results, the location variable did interact with the presence of witnesses to predict norm resistance in a way that is consistent with Turk.

This leaves only two organization variables that countered expectations. The seriousness of the charge (misdemeanor versus felony) was unrelated to norm resistance, contrary to hypothesis 17. In addition, the employment of the victim was significantly related to norm resistance, but in the opposite direction of hypothesis 12.

Of the 17 bivariate hypotheses, the results for only three of them were completely off the mark. Seven hypotheses received clear support in that the predicted relationships were statistically significant and in the expected directions. In two other instances, the hypothesized relationships were very nearly significant. The results for the remaining five hypotheses were less clear-cut but were consistent with arguments derived from Turk.

Multivariate Analyses

Logistic regression is useful to control for the effect of several independent variables on a dichotomous or binary

dependent variable (e.g., norm resistance). The variables that were significant or near-significant in the cross-tabulations were retained; the others (including the one that was significant but in the wrong direction) were excluded. The following variables were selected for the full regression model: previous arrest (PREARRST), previous violence (PREVIOL), suspect intoxication (SUSINTOX), relationship of disputants (REL), visibility of victim injury (VVISINJ), number arrested (NUMARR), whether the incident was in-progress (INPROG), whether witnesses were present (WITNESS), and age difference between officer and suspect (AGEDIFF). Norm resistance was the dependent variable: whether or not overt conflict occurred at the domestic dispute (coded 0 or 1). Only two of these variables, PREARRST and PREVIOL were strongly associated with one another (see Appendix B). The others are sufficiently independent of one another so that the multivariate analysis should have a straightforward interpretation.

The results of the logistic regression analyses with the full and reduced models are shown in Tables 24 and 25. In the full or complete model, subjects' intoxication (SUSINTOX) ($p = .05$), number of persons arrested (NUMARR) ($P = .10$), in progress dispute (INPROG) ($p = .01$), and difference in the ages of officers and subjects (AGEDIFF)

($p = .10$) were significant in the hypothesized direction.²⁴ The R statistics (partial correlation coefficients with values that can range from -1 to +1) show that INPROG, SUSINTOX, NUMARR, and AGEDIFF are contributing most to the model. Prior arrests of the subjects (PREARRST), arrests for crimes of violence or disorder (PREVIOL), relationship of the disputants (REL), visible injuries to the victims (VVISINJ), and the presence of witnesses (WITNESS) were not significantly related to norm resistance (and had low R values).

Table 25 shows that 54 cases without norm resistance were correctly classified or predicted by the full model and 48 cases of norm resistance were correctly predicted (for a total of 102 correct classifications). A total of 47 cases were misclassified--25 disputes with norm resistance and 22 disputes without it. Of the calls without norm resistance, 71.05% were correctly classified. Of the calls with norm resistance, 65.75% were correctly classified. Overall, 68.46% of the 149 disputes were correctly classified.

The model was then re-estimated with just the Turk indicators which were significantly related to norm resistance according to the full regression analysis. These estimates appear in Table 25 as a reduced model. Little changed. The respective probabilities of the four

²⁴ An alternative analysis using forward stepwise selection revealed the variables entered in the following order: INPROG, SUSINTOX, NUMARR, AGEDIFF.

indicators were similar as were the classification results. For the reduced model, 50 cases without norm resistance were correctly predicted and 48 cases with norm resistance were correctly predicted. A total of 52 cases were misclassified --25 calls where norm resistance occurred and 27 where it did not occur. Of the disputes without norm resistance, 64.94% were correctly classified. Of the disputes with norm resistance, 65.75% were classified correctly. Overall, 65.33% of the 150 disputes were correctly classified with the reduced model. Despite its parsimony, the reduced model with four variables did almost as well as the complete model with nine variables. The difference in correct classification between the models was only 3.13%.

The logistic regression analysis suggests that two sophistication indicators (INPROG and SUSINTOX) were the strongest predictors of norm resistance. Recall that Turk stated, "skill in avoiding head-on collisions in social interaction is more crucial than the degree of organization in affecting the chance of authorities-subjects conflict" (1969, p. 59). The inability of officers to use their knowledge or symbols results in a higher probability of conflict. The "art of policing" (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989) is more difficult if the disputes are in progress and/or subjects are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The results are often less deference bestowed by subjects, and

Table 24: Full and Reduced Logistic Regression Models of Factors Relating to Norm Resistance, Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Variables	Full Model			Reduced Model		
	B	S.E.	R	B	S.E.	R
PREARRST	.2638	.5946	.000			
PREVIOL	.3433	.5462	.000			
SUSINTOX	.9584**	.4047	.132	1.1203***	.3790	.180
REL	.7019	.4667	.036			
VVISINJ	-.4391	.3910	.000			
NUMARR	1.4046*	.7436	.087	1.6404**	.7468	.117
INPROG	1.4589***	.5424	.159	1.5616***	.5197	.184
WITNESS	.4507	.4706	.000			
AGEDIFF	.7085*	.3828	.083	.7084*	.3700	.090
Constant	-3.1977	1.0092		-2.7456	.8692	

* p < .10
 ** p < .05
 *** p < .01

Table 25: Classification Tables for Norm Resistance Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

		<u>Full Model</u>		<u>Reduced Model</u>		
		Predicted		Predicted		
		0	1	0	1	%
Observed	0	54	22	50	27	Correct
	1	25	48	25	48	64.94%
		Overall		Overall		65.75%
						65.33%

the use of coercive force by the police. Friedrich (1980, p. 95) stated:

The persistence of the relationship with sobriety suggests that police do use force with drunks beyond that attributable to the drunk's manner toward them and thereby supports the contention of Westley and Reiss, among others, that drunks--and perhaps other sorts of deviants--are particularly susceptible to rough treatment by the police.

The number of persons arrested at domestic disputes was the only significant indicator of organization in both models. Subjects not having to face authorities alone increase their level of social support, which may result in an escalation of police-citizen conflict. The other organization indicators (witnesses present, visible injury, and relationship between disputants) did not emerge in the multivariate analysis.

The only significant culture conflict variable was the age difference between officers and subjects. This underscores the potential importance of the age differences and age-related norms of deference. (Recall that the crosstabular elaboration indicates that younger officers are more likely to be involved in norm resistance when subjects are older--see Table 9b above.) Importantly, the criminal history of the subject was insignificant in the multivariate analysis.

Each of the independent variables used may be a rough indicator of Turk's constructs--so rough that any one of them alone may not capture the underlying construct as well

as would their combination. Therefore, counts of the indicators related to culture conflict, sophistication and organization were computed to see whether a greater number of these variables helps discriminate norm resistance cases from nonresistance calls. As a preliminary step, each of the indices was crosstabulated with norm resistance to see whether or not a progression developed (i.e., as the number of indicators increases, norm resistance increases). To find out how the count combinations discriminate between norm resisters and nonresisters, all three of Turk's constructs were then included in a discriminant function analysis.

Table 26 shows that the greater the presence of culture conflict indicators, the more likely the dispute involves norm resistance. The five indicators of conflict were: age difference (AGEDIFF), gender difference (GENDIFF), race difference (RACEDIFF), prior arrest (PREARRST), and prior violence/disorder (PREVIOL). Although not quite statistically significant ($X^2 = 7.95$, $p = .159$), the findings show the expected progression. Norm resistance was reported in 60% of the cases where four indicators of cultural conflict were present. When three indicators were present, 58.2% of the disputes resulted in norm resistance; with two indicators present, 47% of the disputes involved resistance. When only one indicator was present, norm

Table 26: Number of Culture Conflict Indicators By Norm Resistance Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Number of Indicators of Culture Conflict	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
0	30.7% (4)	69.3% (9)	100% (13)
1	34.6% (9)	65.4% (17)	100% (26)
2	47.0% (16)	53.0% (18)	100% (34)
3	58.2% (32)	41.8% (23)	100% (55)
4	60.0% (15)	40.0% (10)	100% (25)
5	0.0% (0)	100.0% (1)	100% (1)
	49.4% (76)	50.6% (78)	100% (154)

Chi-square = 7.95, 5 d.f., $p = .159$

resistance occurred 34.6% of the time. In cases where none of the indicators of enhanced culture conflict were present, 30.7% of the calls involved resistance.

Table 27 displays counts of the sophistication indicators by norm resistance. These include: suspect intoxication (SUSINTOX), in-progress calls (INPROG), officer's age (OFFAGE), officer's experience (OFFEXP), and whether the call was dispatched (DIS). Norm resistance occurred 91.7% of the time when four of these indicated a lack of sophistication; 77.8% with three indicators; 38.9% with two; 41.7% with one; and 37.5% when there were none. There were no cases found with five sophistication indicators. The results of the crosstabulation were significant ($X^2 = 21.28$, $p = .0003$). Although the

Table 27: Number of Sophistication Indicators By Norm
Resistance Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-
1991

Number Indicators of a Lack of Sophistication	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
0	37.5% (6)	62.5% (10)	100% (16)
1	41.7% (15)	58.3% (21)	100% (36)
2	38.9% (21)	61.1% (33)	100% (54)
3	77.8% (21)	22.2% (6)	100% (27)
4	91.7% (11)	8.3% (1)	100% (12)
5	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0% (0)
	51.0% (74)	49.0% (71)	100% (145)

Chi-square = 21.28, 4 d.f., $p = .0003$

progression is truncated when there are fewer indicators of sophistication, the pattern is noteworthy.

Table 28 displays counts of organization by norm resistance. These include: visible injury (VVISINJ), disputant's relationship (REL), number arrested (NUMARR), presence of witnesses (WITNESS), indoor versus public location (LOC), and whether or not the offense was a misdemeanor (FELONY). (The victim employment variable was omitted because it was related to norm resistance in the opposite way from what was predicted.) When five or more of these showed subject organization, norm resistance occurred 100% of the time. When four indicators were present, norm resistance occurred 68% of the time; when three were present, 53.3% of the time; 38.9% with two present; 41.7%

Table 28: Number of Organization Indicators By Norm Resistance Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

Number of of Greater Organization	Norm Resistance		Row Totals	
	Yes	No		
0	0.0% (0)	100.0% (2)	100%	(2)
1	23.5% (4)	76.5% (13)	100%	(17)
2	52.4% (32)	47.6% (29)	100%	(61)
3	53.3% (32)	46.7% (28)	100%	(60)
4	68.0% (17)	32.0% (8)	100%	(25)
5	100.0% (3)	0.0% (0)	100%	(3)
6	100.0% (1)	0.0% (0)	100%	(1)
52.7% (89)		47.3% (80)	100%	(169)

Chi-square = 13.97, 6 d.f., $p = .029$

with one; 37.5% with none ($X^2 = 13.97$, $p = .029$). The progression is consistent with expectations.

For each construct, a progression emerged: the more indicators present, the greater the likelihood of norm resistance. This provides support for hypothesis 18, which relates the number of Turk's theoretical indicators to norm resistance.

Discriminant function analysis was employed to examine hypothesis 18 (more Turk indicators predict more resistance) and hypothesis 19 (the sophistication construct should be most related to overt conflict). The discriminant function results are presented in Table 29.

The canonical correlation ($r^* = .4110$) indicates a modest relationship between the groups (resistance cases vs.

nonresistance cases) and the discriminant function. The classification results show that over 68% of the cases are correctly classified using the function. Since there are exactly 70 cases in each group, 50% of the predictions should be correct by chance. Klecka (1980) provides a formula for calculating the tau statistic (a proportional reduction in error or PRE measure) for classification analyses. For this analysis, tau equals .3714. This means that a classification based on the discriminating variables made 37% fewer errors than would be anticipated by random assignment of the cases. Hypothesis 18, relating norm resistance with the number of indicators is again supported through the use of discriminant analysis. Inasmuch as the number of correct classifications from this analysis is hardly distinguishable from that obtained by the reduced logistic regression model (68.57% versus 65.33%), prediction is not enhanced much by including more indicators.

The standardized discriminant coefficients presented in Table 29 help discern which construct contributed the most to predicting norm resistance. The larger the coefficient's magnitude, the greater the contribution of that construct. Sophistication (SOPH) had the greatest contribution (.66263), followed by Organization (ORGAN = .61539) and then Culture Conflict (CONFLICT = .45241). The results are consistent with hypothesis 19. This is also consistent with the logistic regression analysis that showed that two

Table 29: Standardized Discriminant Coefficients and Classification Results, Charleston, SC Police Department, 1988-1991

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Func 1</u>
SOPHISTICATION	.66263
ORGANIZATION	.61539
CULTURE CONFLICT	.45241

Canonical Corr. = .4110, $X^2 = 25.25$, 3 d.f., $p = .00$

Classification Results

<u>Actual Group</u>	<u>No. of Cases</u>	<u>Predicted</u> <u>0</u>	<u>Group Membership</u> <u>1</u>
Group 0	70	48 68.6%	22 31.4%
Group 1	70	22 31.4%	48 68.6%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 68.57%

sophistication indicators were predictive and only one organization measure was. However, the relative magnitudes of the discriminant coefficients for sophistication and organization are so similar that one cannot make too much of the difference.

The coefficient for culture conflict is clearly the weakest of the three constructs. While Turk recognizes the contribution of cultural conflict to norm resistance, he states:

To say that "in general, the greater the cultural difference between [authorities and subjects], the greater the probability of conflict" does not help

a great deal, because we know that sometimes men differing very much in their symbolizations fight very little and sometimes men differing very little in culture fight long and hard. (1969, p. 54)

That is one of the reasons why Turk concentrated on the norms of deference and why the culture conflict indicators by themselves may not be as predictive. The crosstabular analyses (presented in Tables 9b, 10b, and 11b above) suggest that norms of deference interact with cultural differences.

In summary, the results of the logistic regression analyses indicate that subject intoxication, number of persons arrested, in-progress calls, and age differences are the best predictors of authority-subject conflict. A truncated model with just four variables did almost as well as the complete model with nine indicators. The discriminant function confirms the importance of sophistication in predicting norm resistance, although organizational indicators also are important. Both multivariate analyses are consistent with Turk's proposition that sophistication is a critical element in authority-subject relations. Both provide support for Turk's organization construct as well. Culture conflict may have to be considered in conjunction with patterns of deference to account for overt conflict between subjects and authorities.

Savannah, GA

In order to determine whether the congruence of cultural and social norms of authorities increases the probability of norm resistance, the domestic violence presumptive arrest policy in Savannah was studied. To the extent that instituting a presumptive arrest policy causes the cultural and behavioral norms of the authorities to become more congruent, norm resistance should increase after the policy is implemented.

A crosstabulation was conducted (see Table 30). The results show that after the proarrest policy (which "permitted" police to arrest at misdemeanor assaults) was instituted, officers were not more likely to encounter norm resistance. Prior to the policy (January, 1987 to May 26, 1987), 5.2% of the domestic cases resulted in police-citizen conflict. However, after the policy (May 27, 1987 to February 28, 1988), 3.8% of the disputes involved norm resistance. The difference is not in the expected direction and it is not significant ($X^2 = .042$, $p = .835$).

Before hypothesis 20 is rejected, an examination of the social norms (actual behavior) of the officers is warranted. If the policy was never implemented well, or really did not increase arrest behavior (i.e., did not change the congruence between the official norm and officer behavior), then Turk's hypothesis would not apply. Were police actually following the department's presumptive arrest

Table 30: Presumptive Arrest By Norm Resistance Savannah, GA
Police Department--January 1, 1987 - February 28,
1988

Presumptive Arrest Policy?	Norm Resistance		Row Totals
	Yes	No	
No	5.2% (5)	94.8% (91)	100% (96)
Yes *	3.8% (6)	96.2% (151)	100% (157)

Chi-square = .043, 1 d.f., p = .836

* More resistance predicted

policy or was it being evaded, as in Phoenix (Ferraro, 1989)? An examination of arrest behavior before and after the policy change is the next logical step.

In the five months prior to implementing the presumptive arrest policy, 17 of the 96 incident reports resulted in arrest at the scene. (The suspects were still present at the scene on 46% of the time during this period.) To determine a standard arrest rate, the number of arrests were multiplied by the sampling factor (2), and then divided by the number of months (5). Prior to the presumptive arrest period, officers averaged 6.8 arrests for domestics per month. In the nine months after the policy was initiated, there were 14 cases out of 157 incident reports that resulted in immediate arrest. (The subject was present in 56% of the cases.) The estimated monthly arrest rate was 6.2 (total number of arrests in sample multiplied by four, the sampling factor, and the product divided by nine). In

fact, the arrests for cases where the suspect was present actually went down from 17 of 44 (38%) to 14 of 88 (16%) after the policy went into effect. There was no indication that the number of arrests changed in either time period (month to month or season to season).

Discretion, rather than presumption, reigned in Savannah after the presumptive arrest policy. Since the cultural and social norms of the police remained incongruent after the policy began, an increase in the rate of norm resistance would not be anticipated. Therefore, hypothesis 20, which relates the congruence of cultural and social norms of authorities to norm resistance, could not be tested with these data. Additional research is needed at police departments that have followed a proarrest policy or have successfully implemented "mandatory" rather than "presumptive" arrest.

CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research has been informed and directed by Turk's theory of norm resistance. The challenge has been to apply Turk's highly abstract theory about overt conflict between authorities and subjects to the specific circumstances of police-citizen encounters at domestic disturbances. What remains to be done is to assess how adequate Turk's account is for understanding this kind of norm resistance.

There are a variety of ways by which to examine the adequacy of a theory. One attribute of "good" theory concerns how well it accounts for research observations. Liska (1981) refers to this as theoretical correspondence; others label this criterion of adequate theory exhaustiveness (see Mayer & Greenwood, 1980). A second attribute of adequate theory is falsifiability: can the theory generate testable hypotheses (Mayer & Greenwood, 1980; Turner, 1974)? Third, well-developed theory also tends to inform policy (Liska, 1981). A fourth criterion of "good" theory concerns its internal consistency: "[a]re the explanatory statements consistent with each other or does the theory generate conflicting hypotheses?" (Mayer & Greenwood, 1980, p. 28). These four criteria will be used

to summarize and discuss the research findings of this dissertation and draw some tentative conclusions.

Exhaustiveness or Theoretical Correspondence

There are two ways to address how well Turk's theory corresponds with research. The theory can be used a priori to deduce hypotheses which are then examined by primary research, or it can be applied post hoc to extant research findings.

Table 31 reviews the results for the hypothesized bivariate relationships from the Charleston study and refers to other selected research findings that are relevant to Turk's framework on norm resistance. The pattern of research results suggests a good degree of theoretical correspondence or exhaustiveness for Turk's formulation as it pertains both to this dissertation and to past research.

The author is aware of no other framework that can be used so successfully to incorporate so much of the previous research on police-citizen conflict. Past non-theoretical studies have determined that there is a relationship between overt conflict and police initiated calls (Konstantin, 1984; Uchida & Brooks, 1988), in-progress disputes (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989), police experience (Blumberg, 1983), and the sobriety of subjects (Croft, 1985; Friedrich, 1980). All of these relationships are associated with the construct of sophistication.

Table 31: Bivariate Relationships from the Charleston Study and Selected Research on Police-Citizen Conflict

Variables	P Value of Charleston study	Past research reporting significant results
<u>CULTURE CONFLICT</u>		
Prior Arrests or prior violence	.109 .038	Blumberg 1983; Donahue 1983; Major 1991; Boylen/Little 1990
Age differences	.054	Uchida/Brooks 1988
Race differences (officer race)	exp. direct. .140	Fyfe 1982; Geller/Karales 1981; Sykes/Clark 1980; Wilson et al.
Gender differences	exp. direct.	
<u>SOPHISTICATION</u>		
Officer age	#	Blumberg 1983; Croft 1985; Uchida/Brooks 1988
Officer experience	exp. direct.	Blumberg 1983; Bannon 1976; Croft 1985; Uchida/Brooks 1988
Intoxication of Subjects	.001	Croft 1985; Friedrich 1980; Reiss, 1974; Uchida/Brooks 1988
In-progress	.0001	Bayley/Garofalo 1989
On-view calls	not sign.	Konstantin 1984 Uchida/Brooks 1988

Table 31: Continued

Variables	P Value of Charleston study	Past research reporting significant results
<u>ORGANIZATION</u>		
Disputants related	.110	Benson, 1993
Victim Employed	X	
Victims' injuries	.092	Choi 1989
Multiple arrests	.074	Buzawa/Buzawa 1992
Witnesses present	.029	Friedrich 1980; Smith/Visher 1981
Public location	##	
Misdemeanor charge	not sign.	Croft 1985; Reiss 1974
# significant interaction with officer's shift assignment ## significant interaction with witnesses present X significant relationship, but in unexpected direction		

Other researchers have found relationships between police-citizen conflict and the victims' injuries (Choi, 1989), the seriousness of the charges (Croft, 1985; Reiss, 1974), and the presence of witnesses (Friedrich, 1980; Smith & Visher, 1981). These are all associated with the construct of organization.

Still other studies report findings on police-citizen violence that are consistent with conflict formulations (see Chamlin, 1989; Jacobs & Britt, 1978; Kania & Mackey, 1977; Peterson & Bailey, 1988). Some research focuses on race or age differences and report findings consistent with Turk's culture conflict position (Sykes & Clark, 1980; Uchida & Brooks, 1988; Wilson et al., 1990).

Turk's themes of culture conflict between authorities and subjects, of sophistication, and of organization were also used in this research to derive and examine 20 hypotheses about the probability of norm resistance. Norm resistance was measured from indications in official police reports of verbal or physical resistance, charges of resisting arrest, obstructing an officer or the police use of force.

Nineteen hypotheses were examined by using data from Charleston, SC. A systematic sample of 170 domestic violence incident reports written from January 1988 through December 1991 were collected and analyzed by crosstabular and multivariate analyses. Criminal histories of subjects

(batterers) and information about officers' characteristics were also obtained.

The results of the logistic regression analysis in Charleston show that norm resistance was most likely when the authorities and/or subjects were unsophisticated. Turk (1969, p. 58) defines sophistication as the "knowledge of patterns in the behavior of others which is used in attempts to manipulate them." The most significant indicators of sophistication are subjects' intoxication and whether the dispute was in-progress when officers arrived. Intoxicated subjects are not as likely to weigh the probable result of their behavior and may make unrealistic moves, i.e., resisting or assaulting the police, which increases the offensiveness of the act. Drunken actors are less able to manipulate the symbols and avoid overt confrontation.

In-progress disputes do not permit authorities or subjects enough time to make sophisticated responses, i.e., plans or tactics to avoid open hostility.¹ Both the police and batterers are less sophisticated at in-progress calls. This is best summarized by Bittner:

[T]he fact that policemen are required to deal with matters involving subtle human conflicts and profound legal and moral questions, without being allowed to give the subtleties and profundities anywhere near the

¹ Bittner (1983, p. 37) states, "It is foolish to expect that [the police] could always be both swift and subtle....Under the dual pressure to 'be right' and to 'do something,' policemen are often in a position that is compromised even before they act."

consideration they deserve, invests their activities with the character of crudeness (1983, p. 37).

Police-citizen conflict was also related to the social support of the subjects and the complexity of the behavior, i.e., organization. The most important organization variable according to the logistic regression analysis was whether multiple arrests were made by the police at the domestic. Dual arrests increase the social support of the subjects and the complexity of the behavior, i.e., organization.

Another major variable that was related to norm resistance in the logistic regression analysis was the age differences between authorities and subjects. Norm resistance was most frequent in circumstances where older batterers confronted younger officers.

Although the multivariate logistic regression analysis showed that most of the variance in norm resistance could be accounted for by the four variables reviewed above, the overall pattern was consistent with Turk's formulation. In bivariate analysis, seven of 17 hypothesized relationships were statistically significant and in the expected direction. Another two hypothesized relationships nearly reached statistical significance. Five more were in the expected direction but not statistically significant. In addition, two variables from this group interacted with other variables in a significant way (e.g., the location of the encounter interacted with whether witnesses were present

to predict norm resistance, and the age of the officer interacted with the assigned shift to predict norm resistance). Only two of the variables derived from Turk's scheme bore no relationship in any way to norm resistance, and only one hypothesized relationship was significant but contrary to expectations drawn from Turk.

Overall this pattern of results tends to support Turk's account, especially given the "rough" nature of the indicators. If anything, the slippage between official reports and Turk's concepts probably weakened the observed relationships.

A discriminant function analysis, supported by a series of crosstabulations, showed that the number of conflict, sophistication, and organization indicators present in a domestic encounter helped to predict norm resistance. For purposes of predicting or assessing violence, all of the indicators (and not only those that show the highest partial correlations) have practical value for patrol officers and for training. The more that are present, the greater the potential for conflict.

The final hypothesis derived from Turk reflected a concern raised by Uchida and Brooks (1988): Will police-citizen conflict increase after a domestic violence proarrest policy is instituted? From Turk's viewpoint, such a policy should cause official norms and enforcement behavior to become more consistent and hence contribute to

overt conflict between officers and subjects. In Savannah, a sample of 253 domestic violence reports was collected from January 1987 through February 1988. The Savannah Police Department implemented a presumptive arrest policy on May 26, 1987, which encouraged patrol officers to make arrests at domestic dispute calls. Because officers continued to exercise discretion and did not alter their arrest behavior after the policy, their cultural and social norms remained incongruent. Uchida and Brooks's question remains unanswered. Future researchers should consider exploring the association between police-citizen violence and mandatory arrest at departments where officers have less discretion.

Falsifiability and the Generation of Research Hypotheses

If nothing else, this dissertation should have demonstrated that Turk can be used to create research hypotheses despite the abstractness of his constructs. Not only were 17 bivariate hypotheses generated about conflict, sophistication, and organization, there were also multivariate hypotheses about the number of indicators and the relative importance of sophistication. The overall pattern of results were consistent with the hypotheses, although not always as strongly as researchers desire.

Some of the Charleston results also leave loose ends that future research needs to tie together. Turk's theory

helps to conceptualize the research problems. Prior studies have suggested that younger and less experienced officers are more often involved in conflict with citizens because they end up on the least desirable shifts and assignments (see Fyfe, 1978; Swanton, 1985). This study, however, found less evidence that shifts and assignments were having an impact and more evidence that norms of deference were coming into play. However, the number of cases precluded any kind of conclusive examination of the issue. Turk has set the stage for future research on the matter.

Future research may also need to concentrate on the issue of visible injury. Choi (1989) found that the probability of officers being injured at domestic disputes decreased by almost 13% when the victims were visibly injured. He surmised that "a plausible explanation is that suspects who have attacked and injured the victims often have fled the scene before officers arrived" (Choi, 1989, p. 115). In Charleston, a negative relationship was discovered between norm resistance and victim injuries ($p = .09$) (see Table 18 above). Moreover, the cases were selected so that the suspects were present. Therefore, the reason for the "puzzling finding," as Choi (1989) calls it, is more complex than mere suspect flight. Subjects who don't inflict serious or visible injuries on their victims have greater social support for their behavior and are likely to view the criminal law as unjust when they are arrested. Subsequent

research needs to confirm or falsify this explanation derived from Turk.

Unfortunately, future research will be plagued by some of the same limitations that confronted this dissertation. To say that a theory generates researchable hypotheses is empty unless there is also access to the kinds of data that would be needed to examine the hypotheses. Much of the research will have to rely on official police reports which are not generated for research but for organizational and legal purposes. "[T]he difficulties increase when the scientist must try to use the data of non-scientists in the construction of theory" (Turk, 1969, p. 80). Officers may forget or intentionally omit data (e.g., their use of force, witnesses, the suspects' sobriety) and attempt to present themselves in the most favorable light. According to Hagan (1982, p. 132), "Data may be deliberately 'fudged' in order to give a favorable impression of the organization." Reporting bias by officers will have a negative impact on the predictive validity of any theory (Hagan, 1982). Unfortunately, criminologists are rarely in a position to collect the data they require to conduct research, and must rely on official documents, according to Turk (1969).

The vast majority of the data...will be the records of norm enforcers, whose aim is the preservation of a particular legal order rather than the scientific, general understanding of legal order and criminalization. (Turk, 1969, p. 80)

External validity is another common problem with studies of police-citizen conflict or domestic violence (see Blumberg, 1983; Sherman, 1992). Those police departments that have allowed their files to be examined by researchers are likely to be more reform-oriented and progressive than those agencies that have refused (see Blumberg, 1983). Therefore, the findings from Charleston and Savannah may not be representative of some of the "closed" police departments. In addition, this research was conducted in two Southern cities. Inasmuch as Turk's theory is sufficiently abstract so that it should have general applicability and inasmuch as the results tended to support his formulation, fears of nongeneralizability are somewhat mollified. Moreover, these results correspond with findings reported by other studies in other areas and cities. Nevertheless, future researchers should consider replicating this study in other parts of the country, since the cultural and social norms of the South or the reform-oriented departments may have affected the outcomes.

Future researchers should consider finding data sources in addition to police records. For example, research should examine the batterers' background more completely. The indicators acquired from official records are "rough" and there is bound to be slippage between construct and measure. Moreover, official record-keepers do not always ask the right questions. How often do the assaults take place?

When did they begin? Did domestic violence or child abuse occur in the subjects' family of origin? The answers to these questions should provide important information about the subjects' cultural norms or beliefs and can be collected through self reports and interviews with victims and family members.

To the extent that norms of deference are a key to understanding norm resistance, it will be imperative to learn more about the extent to which subjects hold these norms and how they are distributed across societal groups. This information is not likely to be found in police or other official records and will require surveys and interviews. Some of the hypotheses Turk's theory generates call for data bases other than official records.

The final hypothesis that was generated for this dissertation dealt with the congruence between official and behavioral norms and tried to take advantage of a naturally occurring pre-experiment. The research in Savannah, Georgia was premised on the Turk-like rationale that the congruence of authorities' norms and officers' behavior would increase upon the implementation of a domestic violence presumptive arrest policy. However, the evidence suggests that arrest behavior did not change in the direction expected--that discretion rather than presumption prevailed. Consequently, the hypothesis went untested and awaits future research. There is reason to proceed.

Recall that Uchida and Brooks (1988) completed their study of violence toward the police in Baltimore County with several questions remaining.

[H]ow do different police practices affect the dangerousness of domestic disturbances. That is, what has been the effect of a mandatory arrest policy on violence against the police? Does the policy lead to more danger? less?" (Uchida and Brooks, 1988, p. 105)

Turk realized that "there will always be found some degree of incongruence between a norm as announced and the norm as enforced" (1969, p. 39). But the degree should be lowest when there is a mandatory arrest policy (rather than merely presumptive arrest).

Mandatory arrest practices have resulted in a greater number of dual arrests at domestics (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1992; Sherman, 1992). The study in Charleston found a significant relationship between norm resistance and dual arrests. Combining these research findings lends credibility to the hypothesis derived from Turk--mandatory arrest policies will increase the level of norm resistance.

While the focus of the Charleston research has been on citizens as norm resisters, the police may also engage in acts of norm resistance. "Specific persons in official law enforcement agencies, as well as persons in purportedly criminal populations and organizations, may be in either the law-enforcing or the law-resistant party in empirical instances" (Turk, 1966, p. 343). It is rare when those who create policy are the same individuals who actually enforce

it. Invariably some "play" exists which produces differences between what is said at the top, i.e., chief's office, and what is done at the bottom, i.e., the streets, (see Turk, 1969). The results from Savannah were inconclusive. As low level enforcers, i.e., patrol officers, did not alter arrest behavior after the policy.² Instead they continued to use broad discretion. Therefore, authorities' cultural and social norms remained incongruent and the unintended consequences of Savannah's proarrest policy could not be evaluated.

To the extent that Savannah's officers were frustrating the domestic violence policy reform of the higher authorities, their failure to arrest was also a form of norm resistance. Turk's perspective would treat the field officers as subjects to the administrative authorities. Thus, Turk's theory could be examined in another context to see whether deference patterns, sophistication, and organization factors explained compliance rates. Because of its abstractness, Turk's theory generates novel research questions in a variety of contexts.

Policy Implications

Turk's theory has been criticized for failing to guide policy. According to Liska (1981, p. 197), "Turk's theory,

² Officers averaged 6.8 arrests per month during the pre-presumptive arrest period (January 1, 1987 - May 26, 1987) and 6.2 arrests per month in the post-presumptive arrest period (May 27, 1987 - February 28, 1988).

focusing on group conflict and criminalization, has not provided clear policy implications; some sociologists have drawn liberal implications and others have drawn conservative implications from it." (See Taylor et al., 1973 for a discussion of the conservative implications.) Such criticism is misplaced. Regardless of how Turk's work is deciphered, he offers a theoretical explanation for some important debates which affect the police and citizens. Several will be used to illustrate: mandatory arrest policies, policies about off-duty guns, recruitment policy, and training. It is important to note that the policy implications are just that--implications and not recommendations. Although the dissertation's findings are suggestive both as description of events and as support for Turk's theoretical scheme, the results from a single study cannot establish either empirical certainty or theoretical confirmation needed to change policy. Some of the policy implications stem from specific research findings; others draw upon Turk's theoretical reasoning.

Policies that mandate arrests for domestic assaults may need to be rethought. Although the Savannah data did not permit a direct examination of the impact of a proarrest policy on norm resistance, there are some suggestions in the Charleston data that need to be considered. Dual arrests increase the chance of norm resistance. Other research (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1992; Sherman, 1992) shows that dual

arrests are more likely to occur at domestics after proarrest policies are implemented. So there are both research and theoretical concerns about congruence of cultural and social norms that raise a flag of caution about proarrest policies that increase arrest rates.

If proarrest policies do result in the escalation of police-citizen violence (via the congruence of cultural and social norms and the increase in dual arrests), police administrators and criminologists have another reason to re-examine its utility. However, if officials are serious about maintaining these policies, the results in Savannah support Ferraro's (1989) contention that police discretion persists in spite of attempts to reduce or eliminate it. Stronger and clearer directives may be required for beat officers, such as a mandatory rather than a presumptive arrest policy.

Fyfe (1980) discovered that 40% of the off-duty shootings in New York City warranted an administrative or criminal sanction.³ The results on sophistication from Charleston provide theoretical support for Fyfe's position that mandating off-duty police to be armed may increase the level of violence in the community. According to Fyfe, off-duty officers do not have the luxuries of prior warning, radio communications or backup (i.e., the assistance of

³ Fyfe (1980) found that 49% of the police departments surveyed required officers to carry off-duty firearms.

fellow officers). They are also more likely to have their judgment and reflexes impaired from the use of alcohol. Recall that Turk (1969) advised that unsophisticated authorities and subjects are less accurate in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of their opposition, and lack the knowledge to successfully manipulate others at the scene. Generally, when officers are involved in off-duty shootings, they have no warning and no time to prepare; their responses are less sophisticated than on-duty officers. Fyfe (1980, p. 81) stated, "[I]t may be most fair to require off-duty police to leave their guns in their lockers with the rest of their uniforms."⁴ Turk (1969) provides theoretical grounding for Fyfe's recommendation.

Officers develop a perceptual shorthand to identify specific kinds of individuals as "symbolic assailants" (Skolnick, 1966). These persons are identified by their gestures or appearances which make them potential adversaries. While the young and the nonwhite are often viewed as "symbolic assailants," the results from Charleston indicate that when officers are themselves young and nonwhite, resistance is more likely to occur when subjects are older and white. While police departments obviously

⁴ A common argument police raise for carrying off-duty guns is the fear of reprisal by criminals. While officers may find some comfort in being armed while off-duty, the hazards (e.g., accidental discharges, suicides, ill-advised interventions) seem to outweigh the benefits (e.g., personal security, deterrence).

cannot consider the officers' age or race when a call for help is being dispatched, younger and nonwhite officers should be alert to the higher likelihood of violence by older and white batterers. Training may want to reinforce this point.

Croft (1985) recommends increasing the minimum age of police recruits to twenty-five years to reduce police violence in Rochester, NY. Based on the results in Charleston, elevating the minimum age of new officers has some merit, since older citizens would be less likely to challenge them. Older officers are likely to be more sophisticated than younger officers as well.

Two decades ago, Reiss (1974, p. 147) stated, "Both Negro and white policemen [are] most likely to exercise force...against members of their own race." The results from Charleston indicate that nonwhite batterers are more likely to oppose nonwhite officers and to defer to white officers. These data support Walker's (1976) contention that the increased employment of nonwhite officers may not by itself reduce police-citizen conflict in minority neighborhoods.

Were Irish-American policemen better received in the Irish-American community than other officers? Did a former blue-collar worker who joined a police force still identify strongly with the problems of working men, or did he identify with 'the community' and 'the law'? Similar questions are important considerations with respect to black police. (Walker, 1976, p. 257)

While there is no empirical evidence of any association between officers' amount of education and overt conflict (Croft, 1985; Sherman & Blumberg, 1983), it stands to reason that officers with more education should be better communicators and understand and appreciate the nuances involved in manipulating subjects. In April, 1993, the South Burlington Police Department became the first law enforcement agency in Vermont to require college degrees for new police applicants. Chief Brian Searles contends, "Today's policing requires innovation, creativity, [and] communication..." (USA Today, 1993, p. 9A). Given the importance of unsophistication for norm resistance found in this research, it is hard to contest improved education.

There is one other practical policy consideration that needs to be raised in anticipation of those who would discount the importance of Turk's theoretical scheme. It is true that most of the overall variance in norm resistance in Charleston could be explained by just four variables. If the purpose was only one of developing a simple causal model, many of the variables and much of Turk's abstraction could be disregarded. However, as a practical matter, the field officer needs to know whether some situations are structured in ways that enhance the risk of norm resistance. This requires a predictive model where any and all cues that might help the authority read the situation are helpful. For this reason, the indicator counts and the discriminant

function analysis based on how many indicators of conflict, sophistication, and organization are present may be of more training value than is the parsimonious logistic regression model. Recall that the more indicators of conflict, sophistication, or organization that were present, the greater the likelihood for resistance (see Tables 25 through 28 above). Therefore, it is the full range of indicators that hold import for officer training.

Internal Consistency--Problems of Theoretical Specification

In only one instance was a hypothesis derived from Turk completely contradicted by the analysis of the Charleston data. (Victims who were unemployed were associated with less norm resistance. Concerns that unemployed victims may be economically dependent on their batterers suggested that they may support their batterers--but this evidently was not the case.) However, there were several instances where the hypotheses derived from Turk's theory were incomplete because the norms of deference were not anticipated and not integrated into the original hypotheses.

As stated earlier, a problem with Turk's theory is its level of abstraction, which makes its assessment difficult (see Orcutt, 1983) and contributes to problems of specification. Liska (1981, p. 200) states, "Turk's concepts and propositions are not clearly articulated." While Turk emphasized the role of sophistication and

organization in authority-subject relations, the indicators of these constructs were not spelled out. In Conflict and Criminality, Turk (1966, p. 351) acknowledged, "The theory as it has been sketched is clearly a long way from a propositional calculus.... [E]ven as 'verbal theory' it does not yet come to grips with a number of relevant problems." Some of these problems are the significance of the relationships of the variables, and the upper and lower limits of the probabilities of conflict. Subsequently, Turk (1969) provided an extended and revised theory in Criminality and Legal Order, which includes the probabilities of authority-subject conflict (see Figure 1). However, he again cautioned:

[W]e do not know just how unlikely is conflict in [the] minimum-chance situation until we can plug in an absolute probability estimate based upon research findings. (Turk, 1969, p. 63)

Turk's lack of specificity contributed to a series of hypotheses that emphasized basic culture conflict (hypotheses 1 through 5). However, the crosstabular results suggested that conflict generated by cultural differences may be tempered by patterns of deference--a subject that Turk built upon but left even less specified than he did organization and sophistication.

This research was not the only reading of Turk that focused on cultural differences. In fact, Liska (1981) criticized Turk for overemphasizing the role of cultural differences in authority-subject conflict. But perhaps the

fault is not entirely Turk's. He explicitly states, "cultural differences [between authorities and subjects] alone do not cause social conflict" (Turk, 1969, p. 54). Two other factors come into play before the inherent conflict created by cultural differences becomes manifest or overt. Conflict will not become overt if it is held in check by norms of deference. Overt conflict can be averted if there is not congruence between cultural norms and social norms, e.g., official beliefs are not followed through in behavior. The organization and sophistication of subjects and authorities affect how congruent the cultural norms and behavior will be. In many ways, norms of deference are a prior factor--they can inhibit (or perhaps enhance) the conflict inherent in authorities-subjects encounters.

While the norms of deference were central to Turk's argument, he really never expanded upon either how those norms were distributed in society or how different norms of deference may conflict or interact with each other. This is where Turk's theory needs further specification.

Police may encounter deference reversals, where subjects refuse to acknowledge the officers' official position but instead focus on age, race, or gender (Martin, 1993). Age, race and gender differences between police and subjects were analyzed in Charleston, and although not all the results were statistically significant, in each case the percentage differences prompted a reconsideration of whether

norm resistance was merely related to differences between subjects and authorities or was complicated by other societal norms of deference.

Research of the age differences between officers and subjects and overt conflict has received minimal attention from criminologists. Uchida and Brooks (1988) found suspects who were 18 years of age or younger and 41 years of age and older were most likely to inflict injuries on officers when an assault occurred. Charleston's crosstabular results for age (see Table 9b above) also revealed that younger officers and older subjects were most likely to conflict.

Both the Uchida and Brooks study and the Charleston results are consistent with an emphasis on cultural differences. But the explanation may have more to do with norms of deference.⁵ Older subjects were less willing to accept younger officers in a norm enforcer-violator relationship. According to Sykes and Clark (1980), the police are expected to treat older citizens with respect; however, the aged are frequently less deferent toward the police. This suggests that patterns of deference by relative position (i.e., norm enforcer-violator) will

⁵ Note that Turk's insight runs counter to some who argue that younger subjects are more likely to oppose authorities (Croft, 1985; Robin, 1963). Because younger subjects have many more "run-ins" with the law in absolute numbers than do older subjects, it is easy to overlook the relative risk posed in a situation where a younger authority confronts an older suspect.

interact with age-related norms of deference. This interaction is also seen in the Charleston data where older subjects and older officers had the lowest rate of overt conflict. It appears that they deferred to each other--that positional and age-related norms of deference coincided.

The interplay between cultural differences and norms of deference also emerged in the race analysis. Norm resistance was more likely when nonwhite authorities encountered white subjects in Charleston. While it was not statistically significant, 61.5% of the cases where nonwhite officers dealt with white subjects resulted in norm resistance compared to only 44.2% of cases where white officers faced nonwhite suspects (see Table 10b above).

Sykes and Clark (1980) would have suggested a different result.

[N]onwhites are more apt to be unilaterally disrespectful to police than any group.... By acting as if they expected the special deference due an ethnic superordinate, the police, from the minority citizen's viewpoint, deserve to receive indications that the minority is not subordinate, that is, deference is withheld. (Sykes & Clark, 1980, p. 103)

However, it seems they are referring to attitude rather than behavior. Turk might expect hostile attitudes (due to cultural differences) but not necessarily predict overt behavioral conflict (because of norms of deference).

Based on the results in Charleston, nonwhite subjects appear to be more aware of the consequences of doing battle with white authorities. Turk (1969) discusses the "realism

of conflict moves." While closely related to sophistication, it focuses on the probable outcome of the behavior (see Turk, 1969, pp. 70-75). One of the ways that the subjects' move is considered unrealistic is if it "increases [the] offensiveness...by violating an even more significant norm of the authorities" (Turk, 1969, p. 72). While subjects risk arrest for assaulting their wives, resistance to the police may be reacted to more severely (e.g., street justice, long jail sentences), particularly when police are white and subjects are nonwhite.

The Charleston findings on gender differences and norms of deference have to be approached cautiously because of the low numbers of female officers and female suspects. Nevertheless, norm resistance is least likely when female suspects deal with male officers (see Table 11b above). When female officers are involved, the resistance rate is higher. According to Martin (1993), female officers expect subjects to defer to them by virtue of their official position; however, due to their female status, they are often perceived as subordinates by male subjects.⁶ Again, the potential for conflict seems to be tempered by patterns

⁶ Remington found that male officers in Atlanta "emphasized the need for an appearance of strength to reinforce their authority role and act as motivation for citizen compliance" (1983, pp. 125-126). However, in New York City, Grennan (1987) discovered "female officers [are] just as productive as male officers in the handling of a violent confrontation" (Grennan, 1987, p. 84).

of deference that go beyond subject-authority relationships. Larger cultural patterns of deference need to be specified and integrated with Turk's theory.

The pattern which emerged from the research in Charleston may be explained by the phenomenon of social deference.⁷ While the social order can be viewed in terms of "properly socialized" members of society who believe in its legitimacy and have internalized the norms, it may also be seen as superior and inferior positions and of dominating and acquiescing groups (Turk, 1969). Subjects need to be "conditioned to accept as a fact of life that authorities must be reckoned with as such" (Turk, 1969, p. 44). The Charleston findings indicate, consistent with cultural conflict, that: (1) older subjects are less likely to defer to younger authorities; (2) white subjects are less likely to defer to nonwhite authorities; and (3) female authorities are not deferred to as much as are male authorities. But

⁷ According to Goffman (1968, p. 61), "A particular act of deference is something an actor, acting in a given capacity, owes a recipient, acting in a given capacity." Manning (1980) believes that deference or the absence of deference is not the singular cause of police violence. Instead, he believes violence is caused by a series of factors, especially the police occupational culture. Turk would accept that deference is not the singular cause, but would disagree about the significance of the police subculture. Rather than the police subculture Turk would focus on sophistication and organization factors present in the situation. The Charleston research suggests that a major challenge is to account for when the norms of deference break down. It may not be sufficient to examine deference to official positions; deference reversals may occur because of deference patterns associated with age, race, and gender.

the Charleston findings also suggest, consistent with patterns of deference, that (1) older subjects and older authorities defer to each other more; (2) nonwhite subjects defer to white authorities more; and (3) female subjects defer to male authorities more.

According to Turk (1969), both authorities and subjects learn their respective roles as social actors and the norms of domination and deference. "Authorities must understand how to 'lead,' 'govern,' 'rule,' and subjects how to defer to the powers that are" (Turk, 1969, p. 43). Female officers may be less confident than male officers in their role as norm enforcers (Remington, 1983). In a study conducted over ten years ago in Atlanta, GA, Remington (1983) found that all of the female officers she interviewed expressed a preference for male partners--a finding that underscores the pervasiveness of larger societal norms of deference toward males.

As a structural theory, Turk's rendition was ill-equipped to explicate the socialization processes by which norms of deference are internalized. He did, however, suggest that the threat of force was an essential element (Turk, 1976), which clearly places him in the conflict tradition. While a structural account can be forgiven for not addressing socialization processes, it is harder to overlook Turk's failure to specify how the norms of

deference in society are distributed given the American social structure.

Although Turk discussed norms of deference, he did not specify them sufficiently and did not provide guidance for how larger cultural patterns of deference may result in deference reversals against those in positions of authority. This dissertation finishes with a challenge: Can Turk's theory be further specified so that the interplay between cultural differences and societal norms of deference is better understood?

APPENDIX A POLICE REPORTS

AGENCY ID SC9100100		CITY OF CHARLESTON POLICE INCIDENT REPORT		OCA ARR 2	ENTRY
6 INCIDENT TYPE Domestic Vio.		8		5 INCIDENT CODE 2809	9 PREMISE TYPE 1 HIGHWAY 2 COMMERCIAL 3 SVC STATION 4 CHAIN STORE 5 RESIDENCE 6 BANK
7 INCIDENT LOCATION		10 DATE 10-3-90 11 TIME 2130		13 WEAPON TYPE (Pistol Shotgun Knife Knife Poison Etc) Hands	
18 COMPLAINT		19 ADDRESS		15 DOB 7/19/61 16 RACE B 17 SEX F	
21 VICTIM'S NAME		22 RACE 23 SEX 24 AGE B F 29		25 RESIDENCE PHONE 26 BUSINESS PHONE	
27 ADDRESS		28 DOB 7/19/61		29 EMPLOYER OR OCCUPATION	
30 NAME		31 RACE 32 SEX 33 DATE OF BIRTH B M 2-28-58 34 AGE 32		35 HEIGHT 36 WEIGHT 37 HAIR 38 EYES	
35 TAG NUMBER		36 STATE 37 YEAR 38 VIN		39 COLOR	
40 CHARGES		41 OFFENSE CODE 42 OFFENSE ARREST 43 JURY		44 DATE OF OFFENSE	
45 CHARGES		46 OFFENSE CODE 47 OFFENSE ARREST 48 JURY		49 DATE OF OFFENSE	
50 NAMES		51 ADDRESS		52 PHONE NUMBER	
53 NAMES		54 ADDRESS		55 PHONE NUMBER	
56 NAMES		57 ADDRESS		58 PHONE NUMBER	
59 NAMES		60 ADDRESS		61 PHONE NUMBER	
62 NAMES		63 ADDRESS		64 PHONE NUMBER	
65 NAMES		66 ADDRESS		67 PHONE NUMBER	
68 NAMES		69 ADDRESS		70 PHONE NUMBER	
71 NAMES		72 ADDRESS		73 PHONE NUMBER	
74 NAMES		75 ADDRESS		76 PHONE NUMBER	
77 NAMES		78 ADDRESS		79 PHONE NUMBER	
80 NAMES		81 ADDRESS		82 PHONE NUMBER	
83 NAMES		84 ADDRESS		85 PHONE NUMBER	
86 NAMES		87 ADDRESS		88 PHONE NUMBER	
89 NAMES		90 ADDRESS		91 PHONE NUMBER	
92 NAMES		93 ADDRESS		94 PHONE NUMBER	
95 NAMES		96 ADDRESS		97 PHONE NUMBER	
98 NAMES		99 ADDRESS		100 PHONE NUMBER	
101 NAMES		102 ADDRESS		103 PHONE NUMBER	
104 NAMES		105 ADDRESS		106 PHONE NUMBER	
107 NAMES		108 ADDRESS		109 PHONE NUMBER	
110 NAMES		111 ADDRESS		112 PHONE NUMBER	
113 NAMES		114 ADDRESS		115 PHONE NUMBER	
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100		CHARLESTON POLICE DEPARTMENT		APR 1992	
EVENT		INCIDENT TYPE		COMPLETED	
1		Domestic Violence (Arrest)		YES ☐ NO ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐	
2				YES ☐ NO ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐	
3				YES ☐ NO ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐	
INCIDENT LOCATION (SUBDIVISION, APARTMENT AND NUMBER, STREET NAME AND NUMBER)		24 HR CLOCK		24 HR CLOCK	
1-29-92 1654		1654		1658	
COMPLAINANT'S NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)		RELATIONSHIP TO SUBJECT		DATE/TIME OF INCIDENT	
[Redacted]		Wife		1730	
ADDRESS		CITY		STATE	
12-B Commercial		Char		SC 29412	
VICTIM'S NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)		RELATIONSHIP TO SUBJECT		DATE/TIME OF INCIDENT	
Same as Comp.		Wife		1730	
HEIGHT		WEIGHT		HAIR	
EYES		FACIAL HAIR		SCARS, BITE MARKS, GLASSES, CLOTHING, PHYSICAL REGULARITIES, ETC.	
ADDRESS		CITY		STATE	
VISIBLE INJURY (Y/N) ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ EXPLAIN		COMPLAINT OF ANY NON-VISIBLE INJURIES (Y/N) ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐			
VICTIM (NO) ☐ USING ALCOHOL ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ UNK ☐		DRUGS ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ UNK ☐		TYPE	
TWO-MAN VEH ☐		ONE-MAN VEH ☐		DETECTIVE/SPL ASST ☐	
OTHER ☐		ALONE ☐		ASSISTED ☐	
*In This Jurisdiction		S-Search		O-Out of State	
U-Unknown					
SUBJECT		NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)		DATE/TIME OF INCIDENT	
1		[Redacted]		1-13-64	
2		[Redacted]		6-2-65	
3		[Redacted]		8-8-68	
4		[Redacted]		[Redacted]	
5		[Redacted]		[Redacted]	
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On 1-29-92 at approx. 1654 hrs. R/O and of. G. were dispatched to 12-B Commercial Row in response to an arrest upon a complaint. Victim stated that she and her husband frequently had been in a verbal dispute over his drug use, and he leaving the residence. Comp. further stated that suspect told her that he wanted her out of his life and that he was going to make sure of it.

PROPERTY EST. TYPE GROUP: 1. VIOLENCE 2. DAMAGE 3. BURGLARY 4. THEFT 5. OTHER

ADMINISTRATIVE: SUBJECT IDENTIFIED: YES ☐ NO ☐ SUBJECT LOCATED: YES ☐ NO ☐ ACTIVE: YES ☐ NO ☐ APPREHENDED UNDER 18: YES ☐ NO ☐ ET CLEAR UNDER 18: YES ☐ NO ☐ ET CLEAR 18 AND OVER: YES ☐ NO ☐ AMENDABLE NO CLERK: YES ☐ NO ☐ REASON FOR EXEMPTIONAL CLEARANCE: 1. OFFENDER DEATH 2. NO PROSECUTION 3. 911 FRANCHISE DENIAL 4. VICTIM'S COOPERATION 5. AMENDABLE NO CLERK

REPORTED OFFICER(S): [Redacted] DATE: 1-29-92 1654 OFFICER: [Redacted] DATE: 1/29/92

SAVANNAH POLICE DEPARTMENT				PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION				1 CTS	2 UCC	3 UCC	4 X Y
PERSON _____ PROPERTY _____ MISCELLANEOUS _____ JUVENILE _____											
5 INCIDENT _____				8 LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE _____				7 CRIM _____			
9 COMPLAINANT LAST FIRST MIDDLE _____				9 ADDRESS OF COMPLAINANT _____				10 PHONE # (RES/BUS) _____			
TIME	11 DISPATCHED TO BEAT # _____		12 DATE (OCC/DIS) _____		13 DAY OF WEEK _____		14 TIME (OCC/DIS) _____		15 DATE (LAST KNOWN SECURE) _____		16 TIME (LX SECURE) _____
											17 BEAT THAT OFFICER IS ASSIGNED TO _____
CLER	18 CLEARED BY _____				19 DATE CLEARED _____		20 THEFT ☐ REC ☐		21 TOTAL NUMBER ARRESTED _____		22 WAS SUSPECT ARMED? _____
	CHO _____ SER _____ ADMIN _____ EX CLR _____ UNF _____						1 CITY _____ 2 COUNTY _____ 3 STATE _____ 4 OTHER _____		ADULT _____ JUVENILE _____		YES _____ NO _____
SUSPECT	23 WAS SUSPECT SEEN? _____		24 VICTIM TO SUSPECT RELATIONSHIP (1) Y (2) U (3) N (4) N (5) N		25 NUMBER OF SUSPECTS _____		26 SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT MADE? _____		YES _____ NO _____		
	27 SUSPECT ARRESTED? _____		28 NAME LAST FIRST MIDDLE _____		29 ADDRESS AND RES PHONE # _____						
#1	30 ALIAS/KNICKNAME _____				31 RACE _____		32 SEX _____		33 AGE/DOB _____		34 HOT _____
	35 WGT _____		36 HAIR (COLOR, LENGTH, STYLE) _____		37 FACE HAIR _____		38 EYES _____		39 INTOXICATED? _____		
40 SKIN TONE COMPLEXION _____		41 HAT _____		42 GLASSES N P S _____		43 COAT _____		44 SHIRT _____		45 PANTS _____	
46 SHOES _____		47 SCARS, MARKS, TATOOS, DEFORMITIES, TEETH _____		48 DRUGS _____		49 BARBITURATE _____		50 COCAINE _____		51 UNKNOWN _____	
52 MARIJUANA _____		53 SYNTHETIC NARCOTIC _____		54 ALCOHOL _____		55 AMPHETAMINE _____		56 HALLUCINOGEN _____		57 METHAMPHETAMINE _____	
PROPERTY	1 HIGHWAY _____		2 SERVICE STATION/ASPC _____		31 TV, RADIO, ETC _____		32 HOUSEHOLD GOODS _____		33 VEHICLES _____		34 CURRENCY _____
	35 JEWELRY _____		36 LIVESTOCK _____		37 CHAIN STORE _____		38 BANK _____		39 STOLEN _____		40 COMMERCIAL _____
41 RESIDENCE _____		42 RECOVERED _____		43 LOST _____		44 CLOTHING, FURS _____		45 OFFICE EQUIP _____		46 VEHICLE ACC _____	
47 FIREARMS _____		48 CONSUMER GOODS _____		49 OTHER _____		50 VICTIM NAME OF BUSINESS/STORE # _____		51 VICTIM BUSINESS ADDRESS _____		52 VICTIM ID _____	
TARGET	73 POINT OF ENTRY/EXIT _____		74 LOCATION ENTRY/EXIT _____		75 ITEM DAMAGED ENTRY _____		76 INSTRUMENT FOR ENTRY _____		77 METHOD OF ENTRY _____		78 VICTIM DOB _____
	79 AGE _____		80 SEX _____		81 HGT _____		82 WGT _____		83 RACE _____		84 HAIR _____
85 CITY/RESIDENT? Y/N _____		86 INTOXICATED? _____		87 WEAPON YES _____ NO _____		88 WEAPON (1A) _____ (1B) _____ (1C) _____ (1D) _____		89 WEAPON (2F) _____ (2G) _____ (2H) _____ (2I) _____		90 WEAPON (3A) _____ (3B) _____ (3C) _____ (3D) _____	
91 WEAPON (4A) _____ (4B) _____ (4C) _____ (4D) _____		92 WEAPON (5A) _____ (5B) _____ (5C) _____ (5D) _____		93 WEAPON (6A) _____ (6B) _____ (6C) _____ (6D) _____		94 WEAPON (7A) _____ (7B) _____ (7C) _____ (7D) _____		95 WEAPON (8A) _____ (8B) _____ (8C) _____ (8D) _____		96 WEAPON (9A) _____ (9B) _____ (9C) _____ (9D) _____	
VEHICLE	97 NONE _____		98 YEAR _____		99 MANUFACTURER _____		100 MODEL _____		101 STYLE _____		102 COLOR _____
	103 TAG # _____		104 STATE/YR _____		105 DOOR LOCKED? _____		106 KEYS LEFT IN CAR? _____		107 STEERING COLUMN DAMAGED? _____		108 VIN _____
CELL	109 FINANCED BY (COMPANY) NONE _____ UNK _____		110 LOCATION IMPOUNDED _____		111 OWNER NOTIFIED _____		112 CHECKED 10-26 YES _____ NO _____		113 CHECKED 10-28 YES _____ NO _____		114 SUPPORTS WITNESSES VEHICLE ID _____
	115 LIST 10-28 INFO (MANUFACTURER, MODEL, COLOR, YR) _____		116 INSURANCE CO. OR AGENT _____		117 ADDRESS OF WITNESS _____		118 PHONE (WITNESS) _____		119 NARRATIVE (USE BLOCK # LIST ALL SERIAL # INCLUDE WHO WHAT WHEN WHERE HOW AND WHY EXPLAIN WHAT YOU DID OR DID NOT DO AND WHY)		
120 SERIAL NUMBER (1) N/A (2) NO RECORD KEPT (3) SEE ABOVE (4) CALL LATER											
121 WAS I.D. REQUESTED? YES _____ NO _____											
122 SUPPORTING OFFICER PR # _____											
123 SUPERVISOR PR # _____											
124 DATE AND TIME COMPLETED _____											
125 ADD REPORT YES _____ NO _____											
126 REVIEW YES _____ NO _____											
127 SUBMITTED BY _____											

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APPENDIX B
OTHER ANALYSES

Norm Resistance
T-Test for Officer Age
Charleston, SC Police, 1988-1991

Officer Age in Years

<u>T-Test</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>t-value</u>	<u>2-tail Prob.</u>
Norm Resistance	81	29.24	1.23	.219
No Resistance	78	30.40		

Norm Resistance
T-test for Officer Experience
Charleston, SC Police, 1988-1991

Officer Experience in Months

<u>T-Test</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>t-value</u>	<u>2-tail Prob.</u>
Norm Resistance	81	50.75	.01	.995
No Resistance	77	50.80		

Norm Resistance
T-Test for Subject Age
Charleston, SC Police, 1988-1991

Subject Age in Years

<u>T-Test</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>t-value</u>	<u>2-tail Prob.</u>
Norm Resistance	86	33.52	-.00	.998
No Resistance	81	33.51		

PHI Association Among the Independent Variables, Charleston, SC Police Department,
1988-1991

	Prearrst	Previol	Susintox	Rel	Vvisinj	Numarr	Inprog	Witness
Agediff	.05	.04	.11	.02	.05	.07	.07	.01
Prearsst		.71	.15	.01	.04	.05	.04	.07
Previol			.06	.00	.04	.03	.12	.21
Susintox				.14	.03	.08	.15	.11
Rel					.02	.03	.03	.02
Vvisinj						.15	.14	.15
Numarr							.12	.10
Inprog								.16

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
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Richard Gary Greenleaf is assistant professor of criminal justice at North Georgia College in Dahlonega. He was a member of the Albuquerque, NM, Police Department for over seven years as a patrolman and sergeant and a certified police instructor at their academy.

Richard was born and raised in the City of New York. He received a B.S. degree in criminology and an M.S. degree in social science from Florida State University in Tallahassee. He also holds an Ed.S. certificate in counselor education from the University of New Mexico.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Lon Lanza-Kaduce, Chair
Associate Professor of Sociology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




Ronald L. Akers
Professor of Sociology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Sociology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August, 1993

Dean, Graduate School

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA



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